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ABSTRACT
The CIA and its covert actions have been oft criticized. After serious 
Congressional oversight was established in 1976-77 (The Year of Intelligence) covert 
actions by the Agency tapered off. Did this mean the loss of a powerful tool because of 
Congressional meddling in foreign affairs or simply the retiring of outmoded practices? 
Have covert actions conducted in the 1980s including Afghanistan and Nicaragua been 
successful and will they need to continue now that the United States has become the 
sole superpower? Proposals to drastically restructure the CIA such as those of Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan are examined. The methodology will include a definition of covert 
actions and an examination of the definition of success in covert actions. The success 
of covert actions will be looked at from several perspectives including short, medium, 
and long term time frames.
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Chapter I
A D efin ition
Covert actions did not suddenly come about with the creation of the CIA in 
1947. The attempt to affect political goals by covert means goes back much farther. 
Spy craft goes back to revolutionary days and "the United States' achievement of 
independence owed much to espionage and covert actions."1 Though modeled after the 
older Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA would approach covert actions and 
intelligence functions as a bureaucratic institution, an institution under more direct 
control of the executive and much less aligned with the military.
The surprise at Pearl Harbor is generally credited with convincing the nation's 
policy makers that a permanent coordinated intelligence agency was needed. The OSS 
was a war time intelligence unit with a fair degree of success at small scale covert 
actions. It was not clear at first if the newly created CIA would engage in covert 
actions at all, but under the pressures of a rapidly forming Cold War there was little 
doubt.
Legal History
The statutory history of covert action covers about half a century. The actual 
legal authority to conduct covert actions comes from a small section of the National 
Security Act of 1947:
1
... to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
Covert actions themselves, as the "other such functions" came to be defined, were not 
spelled out until 1948. Covert actions lacked an actual definition. The entire 
justification for the CIA to engage in secretive political actions was tied to an 
ambiguous clause. "Other functions" could easily have supported simple clandestine 
intelligence operations without giving any provision for more elaborate measures such 
as influencing Italian elections in 1948 or overthrowing governments in Iran and 
Guatemala.
The first general counsel for the CIA had doubts about any justification of 
covert operations under the National Security Act. Directive NSC 4 indicated a need 
for using covert psychological warfare. According to Lawrence Houston, the general 
counsel, there was "nothing in the specific language of the legislation that specifically 
gave us authority for such activities."2 Houston went on to assert that "either 
[propaganda or commando type] activity would be an unwarranted extension of the 
functions authorized by" the act. He did not believe "that there was any thought in the 
minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take 
positive action for subversion and sabotage."3 Still the young CIA was being directed 
to engage in covert psychological warfare, essentially propaganda, in an attempt to 
defeat strong communist parties in Italy and France.
After some analysis Houston found that as long as "the President gave us the 
proper directive and the Congress gave us the money for those purposes, we had the 
administrative authority to carry them out."4 Essentially the CIA's entire authority 
relied upon executive orders and the tacit consent of Congress to allow them to engage 
in covert actions. While this was a great power for the President, it allowed almost no 
role for Congress, a situation which would only be corrected in the mid 1970s. 
Basically the President was allowed to wage covert wars and propaganda campaigns 
without needing assistance from Congress. A wonderful tool, it would only seriously
begin to be questioned with the dramatic failure at the Bay of Pigs. For a time the Cold 
War made it a perfectly acceptable situation. Still the argument that there was no 
authority for the CIA to engage in covert actions has been overturned largely by 
precedence.
NSC 10/2 was to contain the first true definition of these "other functions" in 
June of 1948. The "vicious covert activities of the USSR" prompted the U.S. to 
follow suit. Covert actions were finally defined as:
5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as 
noted herein) which conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states 
or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and 
executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized 
persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility 
for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: 
propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, 
demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to 
underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of 
indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such 
operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter­
espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
There is an obvious emphasis on plausible deniability. To be truly covert an operation
would have to be completely secret from the targeted state or group. Even a relatively
uninvolved paramilitary operation in Guatemala could be easily assigned to the United
States. Before any covert action is taken there is generally already an air of hostility
between the two states. When the U.S. undertakes an operation against some small
Latin American country, it is easy for the country to blame the U.S. Thus any covert
action especially involving paramilitary style campaigns or large amounts of money and
agents will be exposed eventually. Thus for the U.S. government the key was to be
able to deny the operation with a straight face, knowing that no indisputable evidence
would be presented. As long as the covert action could plausibly be denied, it was
"covert" under this definition.
The line between covert and overt begins to fade out at this point. It no longer
has to be a secret operation at all. Full scale wars can be carried out by proxies without
invalidating the covert status. As long as the operation cannot be directly traced to the
U.S. government it is for all practical purposes covert. Obviously the doctrine of 
plausible deniability was largely held to protect the President. Angelo Codevilla refers 
to covert actions as merely denoting "some of the less-then-blatant ways in which it 
was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries."5 In many ways it was a sort 
of undeclared warfare option for the President
This definition of covert actions contains only political actions while not 
including covert intelligence gathering operations. The distinction between intelligence 
and covert actions is often overlooked. Obviously covert collection was to be 
considered a proper role for the CIA, but it had little to do with covert actions, beyond 
the nature of secrecy, a secrecy that was often much more important in small covert 
collection operations than large paramilitary adventures that were impossible to hide.
Importantly, counter-intelligence functions are specifically dropped as well. 
The only relation is the relative secrecy in which they must be pursued. Their object is 
not to influence any foreign government beyond removing foreign spies. While these 
spies may be providing important intelligence, their elimination is not meant to 
influence foreign governments. Obviously leaving a foreign nation in the dark by 
discovering many of their spies, could have large effects on a state's foreign policy, but 
the intent is specifically to protect U.S. intelligence.
Finally, the military is cut out of any covert actions pursued by the CIA. The 
last sentence states in plain language that "such operations shall not include armed 
conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and 
deception for military operations." The CIA alone would be in charge of covert 
actions. Obviously any actual military involvement would significantly up the ante 
upon exposure of an operation. If U.S. military officers or soldiers were killed and 
found by an enemy, that state could easily consider this an act of war by the U.S., a 
significant raising of the stakes. The military's exclusion does not keep them from 
conducting operations, but the military is largely separated from covert operations.
Any missions conducted by the military would be overt or at least not subject to
plausible denial by the President.
NSC 5412 made small changes in the definition of covert actions. Covert
actions were defined as:
Propaganda, political action; economic warfare; escape and evasion and evacuation measures; 
subversion against hostile state or groups including assistance to underground movements, 
guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-communist elements 
in threatened countries of the free world; deception plans and operations; and all activities 
compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing.
This definition is considerably shorter than that of NSC 10/2. Some of the listings
such as preventative direct action have been dropped, but the list of activities is
generally similar. The emphasis is on supporting paramilitary groups, specifically
"indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world."
The grip of the Cold War still clings to the definitions of covert actions. Finally, to
make up for a lack of inclusiveness, and to provide a measure of ambiguity, there is the
last clause, "all activities compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish the
foregoing." This catch all phrase justifies almost any covert action, plausibly even
assassination or other more extreme measures.
The Hughes-Ryan Act offered the first limitations of covert actions. It was
passed as an Amendment of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. The pressure for
Hughes-Ryan had come from publication of allegations of massive CIA interference in
Chile. It would be only the first of many steps to rein in the CIA in the next few years.
Section 662 reads:
Limitation on Intelligence Activities-No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any 
other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations 
in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, 
unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national 
security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of each 
operation to the appropriate committees of Congress...
Obviously it was intended to attack the notion of plausible deniability. If the President 
had to authorize every covert operation then he could no longer plausibly deny
knowledge of a particular operation at least to the members of Congress that had to be 
informed. Unfortunately the phrase "in a timely fashion" has been open to debate. The 
Act also follows the narrow definition of covert actions. Covert operations whose sole 
purpose was to gather intelligence were excluded from these findings, and there was no 
need to report them to Congress.
Hughes-Ryan also marked the first time Congress had tried to define covert 
actions since 1947. It expanded on the "other functions" definition while remaining 
quite inclusive. In doing so it also reaffirmed its acceptance of covert actions which 
Congress had never explicitly authorized in law. Covert operations were any 
operations conducted in foreign countries that had a purpose other then intelligence 
gathering. It is still unclear if these operations were to have a political purpose in terms 
of influencing some other nation, though it can almost be assumed.
Executive order no. 11905, issued by Gerald Ford and reaffirmed by Carter and 
Reagan, defined the limitations on covert actions further. The order stated that "no 
employee of the United States Government shall engage in or conspire to engage in, 
political assassination." Obviously there were some limits to covert operations, though 
there truly had been no limits through the fifties and sixties when Congress looked the 
other way. Ford eager to deflect criticism from the Agency issued the order largely as a 
gesture towards Congress that the executive could keep the Agency in check. The 
order meant litde since the CIA had already abandoned assassinations. As it stands the 
ban on assassinations could be overridden by any President willing to issue an 
executive order. Both Reagan and Bush have also engaged in what amounted to 
assassination attempts against Colonel Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein, though Bush 
attempted such after receiving Congressional support for the Gulf War.
After the establishment of both the Senate and House Intelligence committees 
Carter issued an executive order in January of 1978. This executive order, No. 12063, 
outlined in detail many restrictions on the CIA. The order deals mostly with
intelligence, but there are some mentions of covert actions, which are referred to as 
"other matters" in the document. Plausible denial is dealt another blow by Section 1- 
808 which allows the CIA to "conduct special activities approved by the President and 
carry out such activities consistent with applicable law." The CIA is given sole 
authority for special activities under Section 2-306, except for "the military services in 
wartime." The order also sets up another advisory board, this time named the 
President's Intelligence Oversight Board. Finally specific restrictions on the CIA are 
mentioned. According to Jeffreys-Jones "the prohibitions--on assassination, drug 
experiments, and other malpractices—were not new, but their restatement served notice 
to the CIA that restraint was still required."6 The executive order was merely to 
reaffirm some of the lessons learned in the "Year of Intelligence."
The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act fleshed out the new relationship between 
Congress and the CIA. It once again required reporting of covert actions in a timely 
fashion, but to only the House and Senate Intelligence committees. "Illegal intelligence 
activities" were to be reported, but there is little mention of any new definition of covert 
actions. Had the Act passed in 1977 or 1978 it likely would have been quite a bit 
stronger on intelligence oversight. By 1980 the consensus that the CIA need to be 
reined in had largely disappeared and conservative critics were successful in watering 
down the Act. The restricting of reporting to only two committees also helped to solve 
the problem, or at least the perceived problem, of leaks. Many critics had attacked the 
reporting policies. They claimed that reporting to eight separate committees was an 
attempt to do away with covert actions altogether. Indeed they "charged that Hughes- 
Ryan had severely curtailed foreign cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies."7 By 
making the possibilities of leaks large, any effective covert action would have to be 
capable of surviving public exposure.
Reagan followed in December of 1981 with yet another executive order on 
Intelligence, No. 12333. The Reagan order did little to change covert actions. It
retained the ban on assassination, a ban that had obtained momentum, since any 
withdrawal of the ban would be a public relations disaster. The relevant section was 
Section 1.8 (e):
Conduct special activities approved by the President No agency except the CIA (or the 
Armed Forces of the United States in a time of war declared by Congress or during any period 
covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87 
Stat. 855)) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another 
agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.
This reinforces the death of plausible deniability. It also reflects Reagan's acceptance
of "overt" covert operations. Gregory Treverton remarks that "by the middle of the
1980s, what was striking about major covert actions was how little about it was secret;
American operations—from Nicaragua to Angola to Cambodia—were openly debated."8
Reagan was not worried about denying any operations, except perhaps in the case of
Iran-Contra, he wished to use covert actions to educate and underscore American
concerns. In an interview in 1987, the new Director of Central Intelligence, William
Webster, stated that in his view "Congress has intended that the president be on the line
for any special activities in the intelligence field beyond mere collection of
intelligence."9 Plausible denial was no longer an important policy, now giving merely
a possibility for the U.S. government to distance itself from a given action.
The order also includes two notable features in relation to the Reagan
presidency. First, Reagan mentions the War Powers Resolution in his order. Reagan
had an interest in denying the War Powers Resolution any legitimacy, arguing that it
was inherently unconstitutional by infringing on the rights of the Executive as the
Commander in Chief. Second, is the reiteration that the CIA was the only agency that
could conduct covert action unless the President decided another agency was more
suited to the task. In the wake of the Iran-Contra affair and the activities of the National
Security Council this statement seems almost omniscient, even though at the time it was
merely seen as a reiteration of the standing practice to assign all covert actions to the
CIA.
The key policy of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 was to define the 
"timely fashion" statement of the Hughes-Ryan Act. The decided time frame was 48 
hours, but pressure from the Bush administration almost kept the statement from 
making its way into law. Bush pocket vetoed the measure arguing that interpreting "in 
a timely fashion" as within a few days "would unconstitutionally infringe on the 
authority of the president and impede any administration's effective implementation of 
covert action programs."10 It would pass the next year in a similar form. With regard 
to intelligence functions the President was advised to "keep the intelligence committees 
fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." The language is slightly 
stronger than the prior "timely fashion," but it is not completely restrictive. Covert 
action would be held to a higher standard, the lessons of Iran-Contra still in the recent 
past.
The "timely fashion" statement of Hughes-Ryan had obviously been abused, so 
Congress finally set about limiting the time frame. The finding could be "made and 
shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48 
hours after the decision is made." Obviously any large scale operations could not be 
hidden from Congress, besides a possible rescue attempt. There would be a written 
record of any covert activities conducted against a foreign nation.
For the first time since Congress had inadvertently created covert actions in the 
1947 National Security Act, the 1991 Act defined covert actions. The definition is 
essentially a negative one, of what did not constitute a covert action:
(e) As used in this title, the term 'covert action' means an activity or activities of the United 
States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is 
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly, but does not include-
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional 
counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the 
operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative 
activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government 
law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities 
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of the United States government agencies 
abroad.
The definition remarks on the supposed secrecy of covert actions with the terms "not 
apparent or acknowledged publicly." Obviously the experience of the 1980s had 
convinced Congress that covert actions, especially large ones, were not hidden affairs, 
but took place in front of the world even if the U.S. Government officially denied 
them. Counterintelligence and intelligence operations are of course dropped. An 
interesting inclusion is the mention of traditional law enforcement activities, probably to 
give leeway to agencies such as the DEA who have conducted programs abroad in 
order to slow the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.
A Question of Definitions
Intelligence is a broad area in itself. Covert actions come underneath the large 
umbrella of intelligence in many cases. For some it is natural to "include intelligence, 
covert actions, and counter intelligence"11 under the definition of intelligence. This 
conclusion is easy to reach by a simple cursory examination of the structure of 
America's premier foreign intelligence agency, the CIA, which is involved in all three 
areas.
Intelligence and covert actions are both foreign policy tools but one is active and 
the other passive. Intelligence is the process of observation, clandestine or overt, 
whereupon one may return with useful raw data on which to base future decisions. For 
Sherman Kent, it is "high-level foreign positive intelligence,"12 since there is no need 
to know U.S. intentions, and low level intelligence is largely useless. Covert 
operations are almost the antithesis of intelligence in setting out to change the political 
realities of a given situation. Covert action is a form of foreign policy while intelligence
"was universally to be the CIA's central mission."13 The two lead an uneasy existence 
within the confines of a single agency.
The term covert itself is not merely replaceable with secret. According to W. 
Michael Reisman and James E. Baker "the factual property conveyed by the word 
covert is that the action is accomplished in ways unknown to some parties (not 
necessarily the targets)."14 This is much different than a truly secret mission, in that it 
may be known to much of the world and even its targets without making it overt. 
Especially in the last decade there has been little emphasis on secrecy within the large 
scale actions conducted by the CIA in places such as Afghanistan and Nicaragua.
Of course covert actions can be defined by a simple listing of all included 
functions, very much the dictionary definition. According to NSC 10/2 covert actions 
include: "propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, 
anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, 
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee 
liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened 
countries of the free world." This serves to define the possible actions that can be 
accomplished covertly. The Twentieth Century Fund lists the various functions as 
fitting under six areas: "paramilitary operations, propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns, political action programs, economic warfare programs, special operations 
in support of foreign governments, and maintenance of a secret infrastructure."15 Loch 
Johnson in "Reflections on Covert Actions and Its Anxieties" lists a broad spectrum of 
covert actions from "the giving of instruction and security equipment to enhance the 
personal safety of friendly foreign leaders against threats to their lives"16 to "the 
spreading of biological, chemical or other toxic substances to bring about widespread 
death in the target nation."17 Still obviously these listed definitions can easily be 
classified to see if they contain covert collection of intelligence along with more 
politically oriented operations.
Covert actions have never been simple to define. They are "by definition, a 
foreign policy instrument based upon secrecy and deception."18 In the largest sense 
they can be anything that is done covertly. This is the broad definition of covert action. 
Under this definition a spy overhearing a dinner conversation and a large scale 
paramilitary operation such as the Contras in Nicaragua are essentially the same thing. 
The broad definition of covert actions appears valid from a structural standpoint in the 
CIA since " covert action on the one hand and covert collection or espionage on the 
other are both carried out by the operations directorate."19 Still the definitions in 
Executive orders, National Security Council Directives, and Acts of Congress seem to 
provide a basis for a narrow definition of covert actions.
A narrower definition of covert action excludes those operations or activities 
whose primary or sole purpose is the collection of intelligence. This is not an unusual 
position to take and indeed is reflected in NSC 10/2 which first set out an actual 
definition of covert activities. Nowhere is intelligence gathering mentioned as a part of 
covert actions. The Hughes-Ryan act also explicitly leaves out any intelligence 
gathering functions. Still the initial National Security Act of 1947 mentions an assumed 
link between intelligence and covert actions referring to "other functions and duties 
related to intelligence." Thus the common notion that intelligence and covert actions are 
intimately related is not so easily dispelled.
The primary difference between the broad definition which includes all sorts of 
clandestine collection activities is one of goals. The express purpose of propaganda, 
assassination attempts, and paramilitary operations is to change the political scene. 
Clandestine collection operations aim simply at conventional spying, gaining 
information illicitly without detection. The difference between overt collection and 
covert collection is minor, especially for the CIA. The goal is to provide substantial 
finished intelligence, not to change the political atmosphere of a foreign nation. Indeed
the information gleaned from clandestine intelligence operations is often used to provide 
tactical intelligence for covert actions intended to change the political scene.
By separating intelligence gathering operations from covert operations, the most 
controversial part of the CIA can be separated and examined more closely. John 
Horton, an Operations officer, argues that "what makes people uneasy or indignant is 
the use of secret agents for political purposes, such as secret political war, commonly 
referred to as covert action."20 Covert actions are where the vast majority of the 
serious complaints about the CIA arise from. Indeed Jeffreys-Jones argues that "the 
CIA’s foreign covert operations have frequently alienated foreign opinion,"21 though 
these same nations often look the other way when they approve of the objectives. 
There are problems on the intelligence side of the agency, primarily with projections 
into the future, but these are understandable. Covert operations involve tactics that are 
often hidden for fear of criticism should they be exposed. Obviously massive election 
spending in Italy was likely to meet with public disapproval if exposed. Open 
interference in foreign elections would likely never be tolerated by a foreign 
government or its citizens, at the very least subjecting an aided party to massive 
criticism. It is these covert actions which generated the controversies that led to the 
"Year of Intelligence" and still cause debate today.
The separation seems quite natural despite the tradition of uniting operations and 
intelligence under one agency in the U.S.--the CIA. Early on the Agency more strictly 
separated operations from intelligence, though the Office of Policy Coordination was 
finally dropped. The combination has often led an uneasy existence.
A Final Operational Definition
There are plenty of reasons to finally choose one definition of covert actions 
over another. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters find difficulty with the definitions
of another euphemism for covert actions, special operations, finally concluding that 
"some concepts defy precise definition, an it must be admitted that "special operations" 
may be just such a concept."22 Loch Johnson also finds that the term '"covert action" 
remains a complex—and sometimes-slippery phrase."23 Thus any single definition of 
covert actions will never truly suffice. All that remains is to pick an operational 
definition and stick to it.
A listing definition of covert actions seems somewhat appropriate, but hardly 
inclusive or concise. A true list describing all possible covert actions in detail would be 
entirely unwieldy. Just such a list is partially attempted in Loch Johnson's article "The 
Bright Line of Covert Actions," though the list is truly an attempt at setting up a 
moralistic scale of covert actions. Still even this list with its forty or so "rungs" is a bit 
unwieldy. Also the list could easily mix in counter intelligence functions as well since 
they must often be conducted in secrecy.
The broad definition includes covert actions merely as part of the larger 
intelligence picture. Missions based solely on intelligence gathering are mixed with 
large scale paramilitary adventures. This definition especially within the scope of a 
single paper seems most unworkable. Essentially the two different goals of collection 
and intervention make this broad definition a less than perfect choice.
A final narrow definition of covert actions seems the most plausible of choices. 
Covert actions which have as an intent mere intelligence gathering are not much 
different from overt intelligence gathering from a variety of open sources. Covert 
intelligence gathering remains much closer to overt intelligence gathering then it does to 
other covert actions with political goals. Thus the exclusion of covert intelligence 
gathering and even counter intelligence operations can be easily justified. This 
distinction serves as well to concentrate the focus on covert activities which are 
controversial.
Covert action within the scope of this paper will be taken to be: An action 
undertaken in secret which will not be declared publicly, with the 
express goal of influencing another nation 's  political personnel or 
structure, and whose prim ary purpose is not intelligence gathering or 
counterintelligence. It will generally involve param ilitary operations or 
election interference campaigns. Obviously this will narrow the realm of covert 
actions down to the most controversial, including large scale paramilitary operations 
and election projects, some of which will be examined in case studies.
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Chapter II
Measurement
Having arrived at a working definition of covert actions, the real question is how to 
analyze covert actions, specifically success. Success itself cannot be measured 
quantitatively. Unlike defining covert actions by narrowing the definition, success has to 
be measured using normative standards along with some quantitative measures. These 
standards can obviously be disputed, and many successful covert actions might be seen as 
unsuccessful using the admittedly limited criteria that will be employed.
The Perfect Covert Action
A perfect covert action is indeed an impossibility, but theoretically one can define 
what would make up such an operation. It would have to succeed on a number of levels 
beyond simple attainment of operational goals. CIA planners would need demigod like 
wisdom to project into the future all of the possible implications of even a moderate 
operation. Such an operation would have to meet the following criteria:
1. Mission must stay covert.
2. Any operational goals set in the planning stages must be met.
3. Foreign policy goals must be met.
4. The action must not violate America's democratic credentials, must meet international standards
of morality.
5. The end result must benefit the general population in the target nation.
6. The operation must produce positive effects even far into the future.
7. There must be an efficient expenditure of funds.
If such operations could be pulled off then the CIA would hardly elicit a whisper of 
controversy. The problem is that such perfect operations do not exist.
Indeed many of the goals of an operation work at cross purposes. In order to keep 
an action covert there must be an air of secrecy. Mere secrecy violates the spirit of 
openness in the American republic. Certainly keeping an operation secret makes a covert 
action a less then perfect option in the eyes of the international community. Thus the very 
first criteria for a successful covert operation tends to violate the criteria that an operation 
shouldn't violate American standards or those of the world community.
In order to build a more acceptable set of criteria, hierarchy can be introduced. 
These criteria can be listed in order of importance. Obviously this is somewhat arbitrary, 
but it can still be attempted:
1. Foreign policy goals must be met.
2. Operational goals must be met
3. The operation must produce positive effects even far into the future.
4. The operation must stay covert.
5. The action must not violate America's democratic credentials, and should try to meet
international standards of morality.
6. There should be an efficient expenditure of funds.
7. The operation should benefit the general population of the target country.
The focus here is entirely from a U.S. perspective. For a U.S. policy maker this would 
not be an unusual way to order the earlier list. The highest priority is given to U.S. foreign 
policy goals. Even a botched covert action can serve foreign policy goals effectively. An 
assassination attempt that is discovered and foiled can still warn the leader of a country that 
the U.S. is very serious in its opposition to his/her policies and quickly convince the leader 
to modify those policies. The attack on Libya in 1986, "a veiled assassination attempt,"! 
helped to modify Qaddafi's terrorist support and to convince him that the American threat to 
his rule was serious if he continued on his present course. The lowest priority is given to
the general population in the target nation. Many covert actions in the past have benefited 
the elites of developing countries while doing nothing for the general population or making 
their conditions more miserable. Still these covert actions have very often been deemed 
successful in spite of this.
Ordering these criteria from the perspective of a target nation is very simple. The 
highest priority would be given to increasing the welfare of the general population followed 
by the need for the covert action to stay within the bounds of acceptable U.S. and 
international morality. The rest the U.S. government's goals would mean very little to a 
target nation. Unfortunately for these nations they are not in charge of planning at Langley.
The next step is to assign values to the various criteria. This serves to make 
analysis a more definite process, and as well it enables future researchers to employ a 
similar scale and compare the various final rankings in each category. All seven different 
areas will be ranked according to importance and then be assigned values based on how 
well their conditions were met. The rating system will remain relatively simple.
Each area will be assigned a positive or negative score. Foreign policy goals being 
the most important will be assigned a score from +7 to -7. Operational goals will be 
assigned a score from +6 to -6 and so on. This will result in an aggregate score for each 
covert action from -28 to +28. A +28 score would indicate a perfect covert action. A -28 
score would reflect an abysmal failure. For example a covert operation to defeat President 
Xiter of Commoland might be ranked as so:
21
Table 1 Sample Oparatlon
Foreign policy goals +7
Operational goals +4
Long term effects +2
Covertness +3
Democratic standards - 1
Efficient expenditure - 2
Benefit general population 0
Total for Commoland operation: +13
A +13 indicates a generally successful covert action. Such a scoring system makes it 
possible to compare several different covert actions and conclude whether they were 
successful or not based on some defined standards. By studying a number of cases using 
such a scale a general grouping of operations could be set up from the most to the least 
successful and including operations which hover near the zero score indicating a rather 
mixed result A larger study done of all significant covert actions dating back to the CIA's 
founding would produce a wealth of data from which to decide just how successful the 
operations side of the Agency has been.
There are, however, a number of problems in creating such a scale. It can be 
argued that many criteria have been left out, that foreign policy goals are underweighted, or 
that items like democratic standards inherently add negative scores to the total. All of these 
are valid criticisms. While the criteria set forth are not exhaustive they do seek to actively 
measure the success or failure of covert actions and include all the major criteria such as the 
meeting of operational and foreign policy goals. Many consider the meeting of foreign 
policy goals as defining a successful operation despite any amount of "dirty tricks" and 
general corruption or mismanagement of an operation. Assigning perhaps a weight of +15
to -15 to foreign policy would be to simplify the notion of success or failure in a given 
covert action. As well, there are plenty of examples of successful operations that met 
foreign policy goals that now seem less then complete successes, Iran and Guatemala being 
the obvious examples. Lasdy, there are arguments that it is unfair to consider items such as 
the meeting of democratic standards or how the general population of a target nation 
benefited from a covert action. The insistence on secrecy in a democracy and the use of 
anti-democratic measures to install democracies are some of the CIA's inherent 
contradictions. Despite these contradictions the CIA has survived and grown for the last 
fifty years. So while a given action may succeed the use of extreme measures such as 
assassination may come back to haunt the U.S. later, thus the need for measuring success 
and failure of maintaining democratic standards. So while there are problems with such a 
scale they do not outweigh the usefulness of the scale.
Defining Success
The difficulty in deciding whether a given covert operation was successful or not is 
not new. Even models of success such as the Iran operation in 1953 have been reevaluated 
in light of more recent developments. Revolutionaries in Iran in 1979 "vividly remembered 
the 1953 coup and the CIA's role in it. The acronym "CIA," displayed on so many of the 
street demonstrators' placards, encapsulated Iranian anti-Americanism. "2 There is also the 
commonly asserted position within the Agency that many of the CIA's successes have 
never come to light. Whether this is a factual statement is debatable. The likelihood of 
large scale successful operations never coming to light seems quite small.
Small scale tactical operations in wartime are quite easy to assign success or failure 
to. The goals are limited and well defined. The scope of these operations is often quite 
small with easily obtainable goals. A single operation is unlikely to dramatically influence
the course of a war. In larger strategic operations success must be defined as meeting a 
number of criteria.
Success can easily be expanded beyond operational goals. Foreign policy goals can 
be ascertained. An unsuccessful operation can still have important intended foreign policy 
effects. Did the operation succeed from this stand point? Was U.S. foreign policy 
advanced or hindered by a blundered operation or even a successful operation that became 
exposed? And no matter how controversial and exposed the covert action may become, 
were U.S. policy goals served?
One definition of success from the U.S. perspective is whether or not it met U.S. 
foreign policy goals. Since most covert actions set forth goals that will influence foreign 
nations, the government necessarily expects these actions to bring about a more favorable 
climate. Thus if a covert action is operationally successful, it is likely to be successful as 
well from a foreign policy standpoint. Only rarely do successful operations cause 
problems for the U.S. government and often it is merely disapproval at the domestic level 
with the means or goals of an operation. Raising costs for the enemy as in Angola and in 
Laos are cynical ventures never very popular since there is no chance of victory for the 
proxy guerrillas.^
Part of success is secrecy. In succeeding has the covert operation become revealed 
to the world? Admittedly most covert actions of a large scale nature can be attributed to the 
U.S., but it is important to note if incontrovertible evidence comes to the fore. A covert 
operation that has not succeeded in staying covert is merely a U.S. operation. This may be 
less important if the goal of the covert action is actually more for education or as an 
example to other parties.
Within the realm of cost-benefit analysis is the decision of whether the money spent 
on a covert action was actually worth the effect produced. Was the overthrow of a 
government worth the millions spent considering the relative importance of a small Third 
World country? Were funds spent efficiently, or was money handed out like candy? After
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defining success more broadly and picking a number of criteria, one can get a better 
measure of whether an individual covert action was indeed successful.
Goals: Foreign Policy and Operational
Goals in operations and foreign policy are often easy to enumerate. Operational 
goals simply define what will be considered a successful mission. Foreign policy goals are 
usually stated openly, and commonly covert actions are used to support those foreign 
policy goals. There are times when the stated foreign policy of the nation is undermined by 
covert actions, however, the Iran-Contra affair being the most recent example.
As long as there are clear operational goals it is easy to measure success or failure. 
Usually covert actions can be narrowed down to one single goal. Often it is to increase the 
effectiveness of guerrillas merely to make things more expensive for the Soviet Union. 
Possibly it is to overthrow the current government of a nation and install a friendlier new 
government. If the single goal is achieved then operationally it can be deemed a success 
even if several other factors point to failure as with the Kurds in Iraq in the mid seventies. 
Unfortunately for the CIA, operational success isn't equivalent to a successful covert 
action.
Foreign policy goals are more difficult to define since there can be some confusion 
in exactly what U.S. foreign policy is at any given time. Policies such as the Monroe 
Doctrine are relatively straightforward. Still the Carter administration claimed to be 
following a human rights based foreign policy while often remaining allies with major 
human rights violators. Policy is often left undefined in some areas merely so foreign 
nations can't be sure where the U.S. stands and thus have to be very wary about actual 
U.S. interests. Recent policies in Bosnia-Hersogavina point to an undefined U.S. foreign 
policy.
Assigning numbers to the attainment of expressed foreign policy or operational 
goals is a rather straightforward task. Obviously an operation which meets its foreign 
policy objectives would receive a +7. An operation just short of ultimate success might 
score a +6. In the case of election interference suppose the U.S. is supporting a certain 
party in a foreign nation's election. Within that party the U.S. is hoping to install the party 
leader as President. Now say that the U.S. succeeds in helping the party to win the 
election, but before the favored party leader can be inaugurated he has a heart attack and 
dies. His successor is not as favorable towards the United States, but still basically 
supports U.S. goals in the country. In this situation a score of +6 or +5 would be assigned 
depending on how favorable the new party leader and president towards U.S. wishes. An 
operation which partially achieves its foreign policy goals would score lower possibly +2 
or +1. Say the U.S. wishes to defeat a certain party and their are two competing parties: 
Party A and Party B. The U.S. may support one of the competing parties to the exclusion 
of the other say Party A, but Party B actually wins the election. At least the offensive party 
is out of the picture, but actual U.S. goals were to install a specific competing party. Party 
B is not the perfect answer, but they certainly are better than the original ruling party. A 
failure or negative score would be assigned for failing to meet foreign policy goals. One 
dictator might be defeated, only to be replaced by a slightly more benign new dictator. 
Such a situation would receive a -5 or -6 score. A -7 would be assigned to absolute 
failures where no amount of foreign policy goals ate reached, the Bay of Pigs being a good 
example.
Operational goals score by a similar standard. A +6 operation would be one in 
which very little went wrong. The election interference campaign run in Italy in 1948 
would be one example of a near flawless operation which achieved its goals. For a less 
successful undertaking one might look at the support for the Kurds in Iraq in the mid 
1970s. The CIA was supposed to aid the Kurds in their rebellion. Because of political 
reasons the funding ended, but it was generally a rather successful venture from an
operational standpoint earning a +5 or possibly +4. Other operations which only partially 
succeed in their goals would score in the +1 to -1 range. One possibility would be an 
election project in which rumors of CIA involvement leak out to the general population. 
Because of this and possibly other factors the CIA supported faction loses the election. 
This example might score a -1 since the operation failed, but the failure may have only 
partially been due to mistakes made by the CIA. An operation scoring a -5 might be an ill 
trained paramilitary force which despite causing a lot of destruction never actually wrests 
control of the country away from the government. A total failure, a -6, would denote an 
operation such as an election where CIA funding of an opposition party was exposed 
because of sloppy work and the opposition party goes on to lose badly while the 
government becomes even more shrill in its anti-American rhetoric.
Taken together operational and foreign policy goals make up the two largest factors 
in deciding the success or failure of a given operation. If the CIA manages to meet its 
operational and foreign policy goals, very often the operation will be a success in spite of 
negative scores for excessive spending or relative little secrecy. Without successfully 
meeting either operational or foreign policy goals the covert action is generally accessed as 
a failure by the government and the CIA.
Time Frames
The question of time is essential to deciding issues of success or failure. In the 
short term the immediate goals of an operation can quickly define success or failure. In the 
example of a coup d'etat, the target is effectively removed or the attempt fails. Success 
here is a simple definition based on the status of the target. The problems come later with 
defining success.
At even a slightly later date, a coup may generate unwanted effects. It takes a 
sophisticated effort of planning to pull off a successful coup. "Assassination, in short, is
no work for amateurs."^ Perhaps the rebellious faction kills the head of state in the coup 
attempt and the country is plunged into chaos and violence instead of the hoped for effect of 
a stabilized nation with a friendlier set of leaders.
At an even later date even if a new leader, more to the liking of the U.S. 
government, comes to power perhaps he proceeds upon a course of terror and subjugation 
which alienates large sectors of the population and negatively affects world opinion. 
Certainly the initial situation of a successful coup is becoming more difficult to assign as a 
success.
Now suppose that after many years of brutal rule the U.S. installed leader is finally 
overthrown. Because the population is well aware of the U.S. government's role in 
assassinating a former leader, there is a justifiable hatred for the U.S. The newly formed 
government is hostile to the U.S. government and its interests. The successful coup of so 
many years ago has to be reexamined in a different light. Indeed the Iranian example 
follows this model pretty thoroughly. "The CIA-installed shah of Iran was ultimately 
overthrown in a revolution that gave rise to the extremely anti-U.S. Islamic fundamentalist 
regime headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini,..., suggesting that perhaps the United States 
would have been better off (or at least no worse off) siding with the country's democratic, 
albeit leftist, regime. In the long term even an extremely successful operation can 
become a serious error. Thus covert operations cannot be examined simply from an initial 
time frame, but must take future events into account. The difficulty also lies, however, 
with asserting too much historical importance to a single covert action which may or may 
not have a significant effect on the future course of a single nation.
Examining covert operations in a time frame is not a new idea. Loch Johnson states 
that ideally "one would also like to know before judging the appropriateness of a covert 
operation what its effects will be on the future of the target nation, its people, and their 
relationship toward the perpetrator of the covert operation."^ Some like B. Hugh Tovar 
even argue that some successful operations look like failures taken in a long term context:
Guatemala in 1954 was operationally successful, an example of what might be called brash 
technical virtuosity. But was the game worth the candle? We played into the endemic pattern of 
Latin American history, military ouster of objectionable civilian governments. Our success was 
short-lived. It is difficult not to wonder if the planners had read the history of the region before 
plunging in ?
Seeing into the future may be an impossible task for planners, but the option of hindsight
makes evaluation over a period of time much easier to accomplish.
For the cases that will be examined, both of which took place almost entirely in the
1980s, a less then ideal time frame will be used. The examination of the cases will use
three relatively distinct time frames. There will be a short, medium, and long term time
frame as follows:
Short: less than 1 year 
Medium: between 1 and 5 years 
Long: more than 5 years
Time is measured here from the end of an operation until the present. If the cases had 
occurred further back in time it would offer a longer look at the effects of the operation. 
Operations from the "Golden Age" of the Agency such as Guatemala and Iran offer a 
proper long perspective. Still when examining more current cases there is little one can do.
As for assigning values, the task is relatively simple. A +5 would denote an 
operation that had no ill effects far after the operation. Italy makes a pretty good example 
of such an operation though some would argue the interference in the 1948 elections have 
led to some of the instability of Italy's many governments since the operation. A +2 
operation might be one that had some ill effects afterwards such as the creation of a proxy 
army which takes over a country and then in later years becomes belligerent towards an 
adjoining U.S. ally. A score of zero would denote a country where the population is 
generally given to anti-U.S. sentiments by the revelation of the CIA's interference in their 
country either successfully or unsuccessfully. A score of -2 is exemplified by Guatemala. 
After a successful operation there in 1954 the country has lived through a military 
dictatorship ever since. While this has not been directly harmful to the United States it has 
raised questions about the original adventure and its worth. Surely even under a slightly
leftist elected leader Guatemala would be a much better nation today. A score of -5 would 
denote a country that had collapsed after a CIA operation. That country would then have 
become a dire U.S. enemy launching terrorist attacks or selling dangerous weapons or even 
pursuing nuclear weapons. At this point Iran would now score a -5 for the long term 
effects caused by installing the shah. In these cases the worth of even a successful CIA 
operation becomes questionable over the long run. Short term gain can often be reversed 
by negative long term effects.
"Covert" Operations
Defining success based on whether an operation maintained its secrecy is quite 
simple. Either the action went on without knowledge of the U.S. role or the operation was 
exposed to the world. Seemingly this is a simple definition of success, but ascertaining the 
relative secrecy of any covert action, as defined earlier, can be difficult.
Large scale operations are always going to operate above ground. Paramilitary 
actions cannot be hidden, like covert intelligence gathering. Obviously the target is going 
to know that someone is pursuing a violent course of action. Thus covert actions are not 
truly secret. What is supposed to stay secret in CIA operations is the role of the U.S. 
government in the operation. The citizens of a nation are not to know that the CIA heavily 
funded the campaign of the winning party. Such a revelation would lead to an extreme lack 
of confidence in the government and completely wipe out the operational goals.
Some operations require less secrecy especially when the intent is to educate the 
target. In Afghanistan there was no question that the Soviet Union knew that the U.S. was 
funding the Mujahideen. It was simply an educational exercise to inform the Soviets that 
the U.S. was willing to help contest their invasion. The problem is obvious. If the 
primary intent is to educate the target then the operation should not be conducted covertly. 
Without the need for secrecy there is no need to have the CIA conducting these operations
since they were never meant to pull off open interventions. If there is little to hide then
why can't the operation be done above ground, overtly? John Stockwell assumes a cynical
answer to this question when speaking of the "secret" bombing of Cambodia:
The Cambodian people knew they were being bombed. Unfortunately, there was nothing on the 
face of the earth that the Cambodian people cold do to stop the bombing. However, the people of 
the United States could stop the bombing or at least raise an effective protest of it. Hence it was 
vital to President Nixon that the bombing remain secret here at home.8
Obviously keeping tilings secret can be quite important if the action involves tactics which
would be abhorrent to a significant part of the U.S. population. This is exactly how the
CIA is sometimes drawn into operations which by all rights should be conducted overtly
with a stated U.S. role and policy.
Covertness is also ranked as a factor from 44 to -4. A 44 operation is simply never
revealed. This could include operations such as the 1948 Italian elections. A 43 operation
is one that stays almost completely secret Guatemala is an example of this level of secrecy
where the operation was never revealed until afterwards and only hinted at in a few
accounts. It was only many years afterwards that the Guatemala operation was ever widely
revealed. A score of zero would be assigned to an operation that was partially revealed
with little actual negative effects. An operation of this type would meet basic U.S.
standards and would not be considered out of the ordinary realm of allowable foreign
policy options. A score of -2 would be assigned to an operation which was not kept secret
on any large scale. Everything but the basic details of the operations leaks. The Bay of
Pigs would score a -2 as the operation was generally known to Cuba before it took place as
well as many citizens of Miami. A -4 would be assigned to an operation that was
completely exposed including unfortunate and embarrassing details. Since secrecy is
essential to any covert action, negative scores are usually indicative of failed operations
although some operations may be partially revealed and still manage to be successful.
Keeping an operation hidden or at least plausibly deniable is essential.
Meeting American Standards
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Democratic principles tend to be invoked when intervening in the affairs of other
nations. Often it is declared as an attempt to bring democracy and freedom to a nation. The
principle is no different in covert operations, it is simply not a publicly announced reason
for intervening. "Americans tend to construe their blessings as a special virtue in
themselves that makes them unlike others. "9 Should a covert action become exposed much
of the justification often centers around how it was in the interests of democracy. Often
arguments are made that the dirty tactics involved are worth the ends. As well it is often
stated that Americans hate war. There is an aversion to violence itself which stems from
the liberal ideals of Christianity and the Enlightenment. Thus any resort to warfare, even
covert warfare, must be justified in terms of high idealistic purposes. Seemingly then an
acceptable covert action must at least live up to high standards of morality and
righteousness even if never exposed.
Still there are strong critics even within the U.S. of such democratic ideals in
interventions. Michael McClintock argues that using tactics like assassination violates any
claims of bringing democracy to a nation. He refers to the discussion of whether the ends
are worth the means as an "exercise in quantum ethics" and that "the argument epitomizes
the Cold Warriors' blind faith that the just cause of America suffices to purify virtually any
act of outrage carried out in its name."* * Other critics such as Noam Chomsky are also
critical of American attempts to whitewash interventions and blame the American media for
perpetuating the myth of an always virtuous United States:
With appropriate interpretations, then, we can rest content that the United States and its clients 
defend democracy, social reform, and self-determination against Communists, terrorists, and violent 
elements of all kinds. It is the responsibility of the media to laud the "democrats" and demonize 
the official enemy: the Sandinistas, the PLO, or whoever gets in the way. On occasion this 
requires some fancy footwork, but the challenge has generally been successfully met.1̂
Thus the entire idea that the United States is intervening according to American principles is 
not universally accepted. Still there is an assumption even if it is merely propaganda that
U.S. covert actions take place in order to advance American ideals such as democratic 
pluralism, free speech, and greater freedom for the general population of a target nation.
Generally in order to measure such a nebulous thing as democratic standards one 
can look to the national government. The government should be advancing towards some 
more benign form after a successful covert action. Even if this means merely installing a 
less brutal dictator at least it can be justified as an improvement. Simple things such as jury 
trials and the rights of women and minority ethnic groups in a society also point out 
whether a nation is advancing towards U.S. ideals. This also overlaps with the later 
criteria for whether the target nation has advanced the welfare of the general population.
Scoring for democratic standards is not a matter of great difficulty. A hypothetical 
operation scoring a +3 might involve support of a rebellious majority. The elected 
government has been supplanted by a vicious coup. With CIA aid the rebels are able to get 
rid of the coup leaders and reinstate democracy holding elections soon after. Such an 
operation if conducted with a minimum of violence would certainly meet democratic 
standards as well as the spirit of international law. A +1 operation could also involve 
supporting a rebellious democratic faction, but involve a large deal of bloodshed to 
accomplish its goals including many innocent civilians. A -1 operation would involve 
support of rival parties to the communist party in Italy in 1948. While not completely 
defensible in the context of the Cold War it was an understandable operation. A -3 
operation would involve supporting a corrupt and cruel group of rebels attempting to 
overthrow a democratic government. Guatemala is a classic example of a -3. While it is 
not essential for an operation to score well on democratic standards, negative scores can 
have multiplying effects especially if the operation is conducted in a less than secret 
manner.
Bang for the Buck
33
Spending in the CIA is not a penny pinching affair even today with the calls for 
cutbacks in defense spending and intelligence. Some missions were well noted for their 
cheapness especially versus military intervention. The sponsorship of a coup in Iran took 
"a team of five Agency officers, equipped with a one-million-dollar slush fund in five- 
hundred-rial ($7.50) notes, organized the coup from a Tehran basement, according to CIA 
m ythology."^ Such an operation was obviously a great bargain for installing a new 
government with very close relations to the U.S.
Table 2 Covert Action Spending Since 198014
Afghanistan 3,420,000,000
Angola 240,000,000
Cambodia 85,000,000
Nicaragua 54 6,000,000
Others, est. 5,200,000,000
Obviously any covert action which fails is a waste of expenditure, at first glance. 
Still, certain operations such as the support of the Kurds in the mid 1970s have as their 
goal a temporary rebellion brought about to bring one side around. As soon as the shah 
"reached a satisfactory understanding with the Iraqi with the Iraqis, the CIA was called off 
and it abruptly abandoned the Kurds, leaving them helpless, unable to defend themselves 
against bloody reprisals from the Iraqi a r m y . "  15 Henry Kissinger was reported to have 
said that "one must not confuse the intelligence business with missionary work." 16 Other 
missions are also used as bargaining chips and to increase costs for aggressor nations. 
Missions such as these cannot be considered failures automatically since they do not set out 
to achieve some form of victory. Still missions which fail can be judged to have been 
worth the risk. Failures such as the Bay of Pigs, which contained many flawed 
assumptions in the planning stages and a severe underestimation of Castro and his
popularity, were simply a waste of funds. However, well planned covert actions can fail 
as well.
Failure of a covert action that was well planned and executed cannot be defined 
simply as an inefficient use of funds. There is necessarily some risk of failure in any 
covert action, similar to the risk inherent in the intelligence side of the Agency in predicting 
future events. As long as the extent of the risk is known spending funds on what may be a 
botched operation is not irrational.
Finally, there can be inefficient use of funds even on successful covert actions. 
There is always the possibility that an operation could have been run cheaper. Still the real 
question is often how much of the operations budget ended up simply being pocketed by 
the local military leaders instead of being used to pursue a coup d'dtat or to fight guerrillas.
Efficient spending takes place across a small scale from +2 to -2. A +2 operation 
would be conducted very cheaply with large results. Iran is one example. A +1 operation 
is generally conducted with very little corruption and a reasonable amount of spending 
given the objectives. A -1 operation is one in which there is some substantial amount of 
fraud or a huge expenditure considering the desired results. The CIA campaign to keep 
Allende from power in Chile in 1958 and 1964 involved a huge amount of spending given 
the economy of Chile simply to keep Allende out of power. This campaign would have 
scored a -1 for efficient expenditures. A score of -2 involves widespread corruption.
Perspectives
There is an obvious bias when examining CIA operations to simply consider the 
perspective of the U.S., specifically the U.S. government. It is easier to examine CIA 
operations and their success or failure as a matter of U.S. policy. More difficult is looking 
as well at the perspective of other nations targeted by CIA operations.
Do covert actions help to advance the interests of target nations? Obviously the 
interference by the U.S. is rarely welcomed and often is a violation of national sovereignty 
and often international law. And when talking about a target nation, one whose politics are 
being intimately affected, is it correct to consider the effect on the country's population as a 
whole, or merely on the elites?
Much of traditional realist theory would focus on its effects on the elite of the 
country. Traditionally it has been much easier to deal with the relatively few powerful elite 
and rulers of a given country. U.S. foreign policy does not often focus on the plight of the 
masses in a country unless there are grave humanitarian concerns and often even these are 
overlooked as in cases like East T im or.^ Since the U.S. perspective is covered largely 
already by foreign policy goals and operational goals, a separate factor is needed for the 
target nation.
The easiest way of accomplishing this is looking at several aggregate figures as well 
as some qualitative factors. Since most of the target nations are developing nations there 
may already exist an air of contempt for human rights. In at least some cases of 
intervention the newly installed rulers of a country literally turned the country into a blood 
bath in order to quell any hint of dissent. Of secondary importance beyond simple security 
is the need for economic goods, shelter and sustenance. Has the covert action improved 
the lot of the general citizen or has it widened the gap between rich and poor?
A short list of these factors can be prepared in order to decide whether the welfare 
of the nation has been served by a particular covert action. These factors would include:
1. GNP
2. Per capita income
3. Basic level of political violence and respect for human rights
4. Attainment of democratic values and form of government
Obviously these various factors can be expanded on in some cases. A respect for human 
rights can include freedom from torture, a right to dissent, a lack of disappearances, lack of 
discrimination by sex, and freedom of religion. Factors like GNP are self explanatory and 
simple enough to calculate. It is assumed that simple economic development is an
improvement for the body of citizens and that what are often labeled as "Western" values 
are upheld as a standard. Some Third World Scholars argue that imposing even basic 
human rights may be an example of cultural imperialism though "some features of 
traditional life deserve to go, because they conflict with justice and equity: the low status of 
women everywhere and of untouchables in India and so on." 18 Still by combining 
economic improvement with political and social rights a generalized conclusion can be 
drawn on whether the lot of the masses has improved.
The benefits accrued to the population are taken to be the least important of the 
criteria. They range from only +1 to -1. A +1 operation would be an operation which 
succeeds in substantially improving the lot of the common person within the country. A +1 
operation might involve the overthrow of an unpopular dictator and the establishment of a 
democracy with a new respect for human rights. An operation scoring zero would involve 
a generally unchanged situation for the target population, possibly the trading of one 
dictator for another. A -1 operation is exemplified by CIA involvement in Zaire. The CIA 
helped to oust Patrice* Lumumba in 1960. Lumumba was a popular elected leader. 
Installed in his place was General Joseph Mobutu. Even today 40% of the national revenue 
goes into Mobutu's pockets while the average Zairian makes $190 a year.19
Final Notes
Essentially this study is a mere beginning at examining the relative success or 
failure of covert actions over the years. The analysis of the case studies will provide some 
hint at the proper course of reform for the CIA. If covert actions have been on the whole 
successful affairs then there is little need to make major changes in the area of covert 
actions. If covert actions turn out to be more of a mixed bag of successes and failures then 
there is at least some need to look at the future usefulness of covert actions. Ending covert 
actions all together may be warranted if most operations turn out to be failures.
There is an assumption that the effects of a given covert action have large scale 
effects. These effects can also be discerned as largely being a product of a single covert 
action. Such an assumption is difficult to defend. The course of a given foreign nation 
may have been very similar even without the intervention of the CIA. In some cases the 
nation may have been much worse off even if the covert action is considered a failure. 
Though it seems unlikely, maybe the course of Chile's history would have been worse 
without the large scale CIA interference to defeat Allende for in its first week Pinochet's 
regime "closed the country to the outside world for a week, while the tanks rolled and the 
soldiers broke down doors; while the stadiums rang with the sounds of execution and the 
bodies piled up along the streets and floated in the river; the torture centers opened for 
business,..., and the poor returned to their natural s t a t e .  "20 Possibly the country could 
have collapsed into an even bloodier civil war without CIA interference, though it is 
difficult to imagine given the brutal nature of Pinochet's rule. Arguing that CIA operations 
have little effect lends credence to the view that covert actions are an outmoded tool. 
Factors like economic productivity may be only marginally related to CIA interventions, the 
country arriving at its present state with or without CIA assistance. Still it seems that if 
CIA operations had little real effect they would simply be abandoned as a way of 
conducting foreign policy.
The U.S. perspective being the most important is an assumption as well. Since the 
CIA is an American institution, the bias is not hard to understand. Also viewing operations 
from a foreign perspective would clearly be difficult since almost no endeavor would be 
approved. What remains to be seen is whether covert actions are still largely successful 
and useful tool from a U.S. perspective.
Another issue is the lack of large numbers of case studies. A better study would 
attempt to include all the covert actions that meet the definition from 1947 to the present A 
comprehensive study of CIA operations would include all of the major operations from its 
inception, at least the ones that have been made public or that can be inferred from reliable
evidence. This would include quite a few operations in Italy, Chile, Cuba, Angola, Iran, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and many other foreign nations. Such a study would provide 
more reliable results and allow for a great deal more comparison. Still it is not within the 
scope of this study.
One final issue is the difficulty of using only one researcher to examine and 
determine the results. It is hoped that this bias may be overcome by replication of this 
study using the same scale and rating method in a number of other case studies. If other 
researchers can use this same technique and replicate similar results then it will add greatly 
to the reliability of the conclusions reached. Under better circumstances a panel of 
researchers could be asked to rate the case studies. They would then compare the results to 
determine how reliable this ranking method is. Much of the literature on CIA operations 
examines individual operations and deems them successes or failures. The hope within this 
study is to bring about a more rigorous standardized examination of covert actions. With 
this method the goal of a common definition of success or failure in the covert action arena 
can be reached.
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Chapter III
N icaragua: Seven Deadly Sins or Seven Signs o f Success1
The Contra program in Nicaragua was not the first U.S. military intervention in
Nicaragua. Indeed the leadership the United States opposed took its name from famous
Nicaraguan who fought the U.S. Marines in the 1920s, Augusto Sandino. The
overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship merely brought renewed attention to the region,
especially with the onset of the "Reagan revolution."
American interest in Nicaragua first began in 1855 when a U.S. citizen, one
William Walker, declared himself president of Nicaragua. As accounts go:
Liberals hired an American adventurer, William Walker, and his small mercenary army, to 
fight on their side against the Conservatives. Walker, a physician and lawyer from Tennessee 
who had earlier tried to conquer northern Mexico, landed on the Pacific Coast of Nicaragua 
with fifty-eight men and quickly took control of the Nicaraguan army and the entire country. 
He had himself elected president, made plans to institute slavery, and grabbed the railroad- 
steamship line that Cornelius Vanderbilt had built across Nicaragua to transport people from 
one ocean to the other a route especially popular among people from the eastern United States 
who were going to California.^
The Liberals and Conservatives were Nicaragua's main political factions. The only
major difference between the two factions "was their attitude toward the Roman
Catholic Church, with the Conservatives, in general, believing the Church should have
a lot of influence in government, and the Liberals thinking it ought to confine its interest
to the soul." Walker was merely a Yankee mercenary turned dictator and was later
executed in Honduras by a firing squad.
Under Conservative rule Nicaragua remained in relative peace until 1893 when
a Liberal general, Jose Santos Zelaya, came to power and enforced a rather brutish
dictatorship. According to some accounts the situation evolved into a series of "wars
between Conservative and Liberal generals that dragged on over two decades and
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brought U.S. troops to Nicaragua five times—three times to protect U.S. citizens when 
hostilities threatened, twice to shore up compromise coalition governments menaced by 
rebellious party generals. "3 Others have questioned the U.S. role seeing "the country 
under US military occupation (1912-1933 apart from one year), leading to the murder 
of the nationalist leader Sandino and the establishment of the Somoza dictatorship after 
a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. "4 Obviously, enlightened or not, the presence of 
U.S. Marines helped to create Nicaragua's revolutionary folk hero, Augusto Sandino.
Sandino, the nationalist who inspired the term Sandinista, fought a successful 
guerrilla war against U.S. Marines occupying the country from 1927-1933. He fought 
a long series of skirmishes with the Marines and was the unfortunate recipient of "the 
first organized dive-bombing attack in history"^ on July 16, 1927. Still Sandino 
managed to live to see the U.S. Marines pull out in 1933. One year later he was 
executed by a National Guard firing squad under the orders of Anastasio Somoza 
Garcia. As the years passed the legend of Sandino grew in a country with few heroes 
and eventually the Sandinistas claimed his memory as their own.
The Somoza regime began soon after Sandino's death, the overthrow of the 
elected president a mere formality. Somoza merely had the National Guard surround 
the palace and forced the president to resign. Somoza then held an election and "when 
the ballots were counted Somozaism had won the first of many landslide electoral 
victories—107,000 votes for, 169 against. "6 Putting a positive spin on the rule of the 
Somozas, Glenn Garvin argues that "while the Somozas could be brutal, they were not 
significantly worse than the many Nicaraguan presidents who had enforced their rule 
with party armies. Others have described the rule of the Somozas as "one of the 
most repressive and corrupt in the Americas. Though the Somozas were generally 
regarded as dictators, they were dictators friendly to U.S. interests, "our son of a 
bitch," as FDR would claim.9
Anastasio Somoza Garcia was killed by a poet turned assassin in 1956. His 
son Luis took over and ran the country stepping down after only one term to be 
replaced by Rene Schick, a Somoza puppet, until 1967. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, or 
Tachito, ran for president despite the best advice of his brother Luis who advocated a 
more liberal form of dictatorship at least in appearances. Another Somoza as president 
would damage Nicaragua's international stature. Tachito proved this quite early in the 
election campaign by setting the National Guard upon supporters of the opposition 
candidate. As the crowd marched towards the National Palace, "the Guardia opened 
fire, killing at least forty marchers and wounding more than one hundred others.
Obviously domestic opposition to the rule of the Somozas existed. One 
disaffected group which would later come to prominence was the FSLN, the Sandinista 
Front. It was formed originally by three leftist student leaders: Carlos Fonseca, Tomas 
Borge, and Silvio Mayorga. All three were influenced by "Marxism-Leninism, but 
they did not spell it out in their early plans."^ The revolution in Cuba inspired them to 
think that a guerrilla movement might be possible in Nicaragua. Still the FSLN 
"repeatedly met with failure in its military o p e r a t i o n s . " ^  Indeed after the first two 
military campaigns in 1963 and 1967, "the few remaining guerrillas retreated so deeply 
into the jungle that, for all practical purposes, they ceased to exist" ̂  They also mixed 
in the nationalism of Sandino, Fonseca in particular insisting that the group name itself 
after Sandino. They would finally become an important resistance group in December 
of 1974.
On December 18,1974 a Sandinista squad burst into a Christmas party hosted
by Jose Maria Castillo and took over forty important guests hostage including
Somoza's brother in law. Somoza was forced to negotiate with the guerrillas—a
prospect that was not altogether pleasant for him:
I asked the Federal Reserve Board for five million dollars because I was not certain what the 
final negotiated figure would be. As it turned out, we agreed on one million dollars, so we 
had money to spare. The thought of paying that amount of money to Communist-trained 
terrorists, who had kidnapped and killed, caused me to suffer mental agony. But what was I to
do? There was no way I could place a dollar value on the lives of people involved. It had to
be done. ̂
The 1974 raid brought international attention to the Sandinistas and their cause, at a 
point when "to most Nicaraguans, the Sandinista Front was presumed to be dead or 
d y i n g . " ^ 5  Though it was a spectacular tactical success it brought on a crisis within the 
leadership of the FSLN. The FSLN would separate into three distinct factions: one 
emphasizing a very prolonged war in which the consciousness of the people had to be 
raised, one pushing for a prolonged peasant war, and the 'terceristas' or third-way who 
hoped to "reach out to non-Marxists in the hope of producing a quick victory through
mass insurrection." 16
After the 1974 raid Somoza quickly pressed the National Guard into service 
leading to widespread massacres including two mass executions totaling eighty-six 
civilians within just a few weeks. 17 This level of repression eventually led to criticism 
from the United States during the Carter administration. While Carter was not willing 
to completely abandon Somoza on the basis of human rights, his administration did 
seek to convince Somoza that he had to clean up his image or lose military assistance 
from the United States. To Somoza the Carter administration's stress on human rights 
was "a tool of destruction" 18 to be used on Nicaragua. Meanwhile Somoza, especially 
after the corruption surrounding the 1972 Managua earthquake, had begun to lose 
support from even the business sectors.
On January 10,1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was assassinated. He had been 
the head of La Prensa, the only tolerated opposition to Somoza. A harsh critic of the 
regime he quickly became a martyr. His assassination brought the anti-Somoza forces 
together, business and labor leaders had already been meeting with Somoza in an effort 
to convince him to open up and reform the government. Soon after the murder of 
Chamorro, they began calling on him to resign. At the same time the Sandinistas 
heated up their armed resistance. Commander Zero, Eden Pastora, led a raid on the 
National Palace galvanizing support, though Pastora would later turn up as a Contra
commander. Business and labor leaders were "sparked into action, declaring a general 
strike the day after the phenomenally successful National Palace occupation ended." 19 
Somoza's prospects were dim.
Stubborn till the end, Somoza refused to step aside and instead "tried to shoot 
his way to peace," sending the National Guard to lay "siege to the rebellious cities, 
cutting off food and utilities, and bombing and strafing by a i r .  "20 The Guard would 
then enter the smoking cities and proceed to "clean-up" which often meant killing any 
male over 14. Despite these displays of brutality the Carter administration stuck by 
Somoza longer than expected. Essentially the Carter administration tried to get Somoza 
to step down to be replaced by an associate who was not related to the Somoza family. 
Failing that, the Carter administration hoped to install a new moderate government 
without Sandinista dominance and most importantly to keep the National Guard largely 
intact. This was a policy of Somocismo without Somoza.
As the Sandinistas launched their final offensive on May 29, 1979 things began 
to look especially bad for Somoza The United States was willing to try one last time to 
stave off a total Sandinista victory. Somoza finally agreed to step down now that the 
Sandinista victory was inevitable. An attempt was made to set up a new government by 
ceding power to Francisco Urcuyo, head of Congress, as the new president. Urcuyo 
would then negotiate a new government with moderate groups and the Sandinistas and 
maintain the National Guard in part. The problem was Urcuyo "was prepared to serve 
out Somoza's t e r m . "21 On July 19 the Sandinistas took power. The CIA's covert 
action would begin with Reagan's election. Eventually about $500 million would be 
spent trying to oust the S a n d i n i s t a s . 22
Foreign Policy Goals
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Foreign policy goals should be relatively easy to determine. Governments
regularly announce foreign policy positions and take stances on international issues.
Presidents, prime ministers, and diplomats all comment on their country's foreign
policy. The problem of course is that much of foreign policy is unofficial.
Governments often pursue policies antithetical to announced polices, an obvious U.S.
example was the Iran-Contra affair.
The case in Nicaragua was one of conflicting foreign policy goals. The initial
contention was that Nicaragua was supplying El Salvador's leftist guerrillas. This was
tied to a Soviet/Cuban imperialist conspiracy. Even more ridiculous claims of an actual
invasion force from Nicaragua were also put forward as proof of a new "domino"
theory in Central America proved by an increased military presence "nearly six times
the size of the old National G u a r d . ” 2 3  Still all of this was to provide support for the
Reagan policy of creating and supporting the Contras.
In an early speech on foreign policy Reagan harshly criticized Nicaragua.
"Violence has been Nicaragua's most important export to the world," according to
Reagan. Still despite his heated rhetoric, Reagan made clear the United States limited
foreign policy goals:
Let us be clear as to the American attitude toward the government of Nicaragua. We do not 
seek its overthrow. Our interest is to insure that it does not infect its neighbors through the 
export of subversion and violence. Our purpose, in conformity with American and 
international law, is to prevent the flow of arms to E l  Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica. We have attempted to have a dialogue with the government of Nicaragua but it 
persists in its efforts to spread v i o l e n c e . ^
Thus the stated goal of American foreign policy was merely to stop the flow of
weapons to El Salvador. The other countries where Nicaragua was supposed to be
sending arms were relatively unimportant and mainly added for effect or in order to
bolster the notion that Nicaragua was supporting a widespread communist revolution in
Central America. Thus our stated goals were relatively simple in regard to Nicaragua,
basically being a side note to foreign policy regarding El Salvador. It would not seem 
that the U.S. would be terribly interested in the Sandinistas as long as they were willing 
to end military aid to El Salvador's guerrilla movement
Problems with this stated policy arose instantly. First, it was difficult to prove 
that a large scale arms shipment program was underway. The arms supply connection 
was relatively minor and was not the primary reason for the success of El Salvador’s 
rebels. "Despite administration assertions of success in interdicting arms shipped by 
land, and more recent charges that shipments are continuing, primarily by air, not a 
single major shipment of arms has been captured in or near El Salvador since a Costa 
Rican pilot was caught in 1981 . "25 Some argued as well that the government was 
applying a doctrine "invented by Lucas Alaman: blaming internal problems on foreign 
governments."26 El Salvador had a problem with leftist guerrillas because of the brutal 
rule of El Salvador's right wing elite, not because of Nicaragua.
The Administration's proof came largely from a series of captured documents 
that were released to the public in the form of a White Paper, Communist Interference 
in El Salvador. Whether the documents actually were captured from Salvadoran 
guerrillas is a matter of some debate as Philip Agee, a famous or infamous former CIA 
employee, maintains. According to Agee, "the Salvadorans may well have captured 
some documents, but the most sensational in this White Paper are, I believe, 
fabricated. "27 Agee was far from alone in his questioning of the White Paper released 
by the State Department Within a month the White Paper was "exposed in the media 
as a textbook case of U.S. government disinformation."28 Wall Street Journal 
reporter, Jonathan Kwitny, broke the story on June 8th and later spelled out the case 
against the White Paper in his book, Endless Enemies, stating that instead of proving 
the case of a grand communist conspiracy against the government of El Salvador the 
documents:
show the opposite: a disorganized, ragtag rebellion. Some of its participants have gone
around begging for help from the most likely sources and have been consistently stalled off
and sent home empty-handed, or with much less then they asked for. Not only do the 
documents not prove the thesis, the thesis simply isn't t ru e .29
Still the White Paper served its purpose despite being exposed as a major exaggeration.
Along with Ronald Reagan's rhetoric, the White Paper helped win over
Congress and most Americans who "agreed that the Sandinista government was both
internally repressive and a threat to the h e m i s p h e r e .  " 3 0  As it was presented to the
public the purpose was merely to curb arm shipments to the Salvadoran rebels. The
real problem, especially frustrating to Reagan, was that he could never get widespread
support for his programs in Nicaragua. Indeed he was able to curry more favor with
Congress than the American public. Gallup polls taken up until 1989 on the handling of
Nicaragua showed consistently high disapproval ratings, never once reaching more
than a 35% approval rating.31
Another problem was that Administration officials and the Contras themselves
were hinting at the true aims of U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua. While the United
States may have only intended the Contras "as an instrument of cheap containment, that
wouldn't prevent the Contras from pursuing their own a g e n d a . " 3 2  Much of the
evidence points to the notion that the Contras shared their goals with their sponsors in
Washington. The Contra intervention was always in hopes of overthrowing the
Sandinistas.
At one point Congress through the Boland ammendment put its foot down on 
aid to the Contras. The ammendment was supposed to stop any action by the CIA 
which was aimed at destabilizing the government of Nicaragua. It specifically 
authorized an end to all military aid to the Contras by either the CIA or the Department 
of Defense.33 Congress did not forsee that a overzealous president would be willing to 
simply shift the operation over to the National Security Council.
Still there remained an atmosphere of mystery among the United States foreign 
policy goals regarding Nicaragua. Some scholars such as John Norton Moore have 
tried to defend the Reagan Administration's claims. Moore claims that the notion that
the United States is trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua is ludicrous. 
According to Moore the U.S. desired good relations with the commandantes, President 
Reagan's statements have been taken out of context, the Boland amendment says the 
U.S. cannot seek to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, official policy statements 
did not advocate overthrow of the Sandinistas, and the U.S. would have every right to 
overthrow the Sandinistas, though the U.S. was not engaged in overthrowing the 
S a n d i n i s t a s . 3 4  None of these arguments is particularly convincing. The United States 
through the Carter administration tried to keep the Sandinistas out of power right up 
until the end. President Reagan's slips about the true purpose of the Contras to make 
the Sandinistas "say uncle," were only too close to the truth. The Boland amendment 
was not exactly a strict limit on Contra activities, and by May of 1 9 8 3  Chairman Boland 
himself recognized that anyone "with any sense, would have to come to the conclusion 
that the operation is illegal, (and) that the purpose and the mission of the operation was 
to overthrow the government of N i c a r a g u a .  "35 Official policy statements meant little, 
"since "arms interdiction" was to be the official rationale for supporting the Contras, 
administration spokesmen persisted to claim that Nicaragua was shipping vast amounts 
of weaponry to El S a l v a d o r . " 3 6  Finally, in 1 9 8 6 ,  the World Court disagreed with the 
stated right of the U.S. to intervene in Nicaragua.
The Boland amendment would come about in direct response to this unspoken 
foreign policy agenda. Essentially the Administration's unspoken policy was one of 
overthrowing the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The sabotage operations of the 
Contras, even early on, pointed to a policy of destabilizing the Nicaraguan state, not 
merely preventing the shipping of arms to El Salvador. A policy of destabilization is 
nothing new in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed many of the nations of Central and South 
America have been subjected to U.S. power at various periods. Cuba, Mexico, 
Guatemala, Chile, and others have all been targets of invasion, election interference, 
and even assassination attempts.
Eventually even moderate members of Congress such as Speaker Jim Wright 
realized exactly what the unstated U.S. goal was. Wright speaking on renewed Contra 
funding in 1985 stated that "for the first time we're going to be saying that we are 
accessories to overthrowing the government of N i c a r a g u a .  " 3 7  There was no longer 
doubt of the real intentions of the United States in regards to the government of 
Nicaragua. The U.S. intended to overthrow the government of Nicaragua by way of a 
proxy army, economic warfare, and election financing. All of these techniques 
involved the services of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As the actual foreign policy goals have been established little remains except to 
see if the goal of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua was reached. On 
February 26, 1990 Daniel Ortega peacefully conceded defeat to the U.S. supported 
opposition, while "U.S. policy makers gloated over the r e s u l t s . "38 After a decade the 
Sandinistas had finally been defeated by electoral means. The Contras had largely 
faded from the scene no longer a significant military force without Congressional 
funding. While the victory was long and costly in the long term U.S. foreign policy 
goals were met. For this operation foreign policy goals can be assigned a +7. The 
election of the Chamorro government was clearly a foreign policy victory.
Operational Success
It is difficult to state the actual operational goals in the CIA's involvement in 
Nicaragua. Part of this difficulty stems from a foreign policy which was largely 
secretive and unannounced. While many observers fully understood that the aim was 
to overthrow the Sandinistas, officially that was never the policy. The operation also 
suffered breaks in funding which led to a lack of continuity.
Since it can be assumed that the CIA operation was an attempt to overthrow the 
government of Nicaragua, then their primary operational goal was to mold the Contras
into an effective guerrilla force capable of destabilizing the government. Similar 
operations in Laos and Iraq had been less then successful with the Agency eventually 
tarnished with the implication that they had cynically manipulated peasants and then 
hung them out to dry. The bulk of CIA spending was directed towards supporting the 
Contras, but there were other facets to the CIA program.
Unlike foreign policy goals the operational success of the intervention and 
destabilization campaign was decidedly mixed. The Contras were basically a 
unadulterated failure. Despite large investments in training, equipping, and supplying 
the Contras, the "years of United States assistance never produced an insurgency 
capable of sustaining itself among the population in N i c a r a g u a . " ^  The Contras were 
little more than a well paid band of mercenaries "who routinely attack civilian 
populations. Their forces kidnap, torture, and murder health workers, teachers, and 
other government em p loyees."^  "Their inept guerrilla campaign serves chiefly to 
discredit themselves and their American supporters."^ They were never the proxy 
army of "freedom fighters" that Ronald Reagan had hoped for.
The Contras' military campaign never moved much beyond border raids. The 
typical Contra incursion into Nicaragua involved crossing the border of Honduras and 
launching small raids on villages possibly picking up recruits or forcibly taking them. 
Their was little coordination of attacks even when large scale campagins were cooked 
up by U.S. military advisors in Honduras. The Contra military campaign was highly 
successful at causing terror among the population of northern Nicaragua, but it never 
seriously threatened the population centers such as Managua in Central Nicaragua.
Their human rights record was deblorable. Indeed Congress set aside three 
million dollars of a 100 million dollar aid package to the Contras in 1986 when it finally 
renewed funding. The three million was specifically to train the Contras to respect 
international norms of human rights. In an interview one Contra officer, who was 
obviously in need of human rights training, was quite frank about what happened to
captured prisoners answering the interviewer's question on what would happen if one
did not wish to answer questions during an interrogation:
You would be beaten until you talked. Also, an interrogation is carried out intensively only 
when it can be determined that the subject can give information of interest. No time is wasted 
interrogating people who can't give any information. CDS members (Sandinista military), for 
example, don't usually give any useful information. So they aren't interrogated. They're 
eliminated right away. A real interrogation is useful only if one has captured a soldier in 
battle. Then one can get from him information that's directly applicable.42
Reviewing the record of atrocities committed by the Contras, the Brody report issued in
1985 by Reed Brody concludes that "the preponderance of the evidence indicates that
the Contras are committing serious abuses against c i v i l i a n s . "43 Brody's report met
with criticism from the Reagan administration, but was confirmed by the New York
Times, CBS News and Americas Watch. And human rights were not the only problem
with the Contras. They also had a corrupt leadership which was quite happy to take
U.S. money and less worried about winning a war. Finally, there are even some
allegations that the Contras were dealing in drugs to finance their c a u s e . 4 4
Corruption was well known in the Somoza regime, and it would remain under
his old National Guard in Honduras. Since the leadership of the Contras was
overwhelmingly former National Guard members the Contras would be run by a
corrupt leadership. Lower level Contra commanders attacked the leadership numerous
times over corruption. Often even basic foodstuffs would never make it to the troops in
the field. The leader of the FDN, a former National Guard member, Enrique
Bermudez, survived numerous attempts by lower level commanders to remove him.
Often Bermudez was no where to be found, "spending time in Tegucigalpa with his
lover and c h i l d .  " 4 5  Bermudez was accused of corruption throughout his leadership of
the Contras, but with CIA support he stayed in power. At one point the CIA set up a
system of distributing funds through a central coordinator, Hugo Villagra, in order to
get weapons and food directly to troops. It ended two months later, and upon his
resignation Villagra maintained that there was "a lack of authentic leadership,
professionalism, and ethics in the majority of the military personnel who hold positions
in the upper echelons of the FDN [and] who have transformed this sacred cause into a 
way to make a l i v i n g .  " 4 6  By keeping the National Guard leadership the C I A  kept intact 
its rampant corruption.
R. Pardo-Maurer, a political officer with the Contras from 1986 to 1988 argues 
that the real failing of the Contras was their leadership. The Contras were without 
democratic traditions. Washington tried to create a democratic force though 
"assemblies, committees, secretariats came and went; declarations, charters, covenants 
solemnly succeeded one a n o t h e r .  "47 The true problem resided in the leadership of the 
Contras, the former National Guard. "They seemed to grudge, not embrace, 
d e m o c r a c y .  "48 With a well entrenched leadership unwilling to implement democratic 
reforms the Contras would never be a viable alternate to the Sandinistas.
Another problem with the operation came from the mining of Nicaraguan 
harbors. The problem here was that it wasn't carried out by the Contras, but by the 
CIA and it amounted to little more than an act of war. It caused widespread outrage 
among even Congressional supporters of the Contras such as Barry Gold water. It 
helped to outrage even European allies of the United States. In short it was "one of the 
most catastrophic covert actions in the history of U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e . "49 Mining the 
harbors turned out to be a huge mistake. Eventually it would lead to a strong ruling 
against U.S. interference in Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice.
Another error came with the discovery of a CIA manual for training the Contras 
which advocated assassination. The manual written by a former Special Forces major 
referred to neutralizing Sandinista officials in villages. It also referred to using 
criminals and creating martyrs by provoking confrontations, but these sections were 
edited out by Edgar Chamorro, propaganda chief for the FDN. The manual caused a 
tremendous uproar because it implied that the CIA, quite illegally, was again engaged in 
political assassinations, which had been specifically banned by executive order.
The cutoff of aid in May of 1984 was difficult for the CIA and the Contras. At 
this point the CIA operation would for all purposes cease. Unfortunately Ronald 
Reagan was not willing to take no as an answer from Congress and so he told his staff: 
"We can't break the law, but within the law, we have to do whatever we can to help the 
Contras s u r v i v e .  "50 Despite his claims, the interim funding project for the Contras 
would blow up into a terrible scandal involving Iran, arms trading, hostages, and 
Swiss bank accounts.
The Contra part of the Iran-Contra affair was led by an NSC staffer, one 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. North was completely behind the Contra cause. 
While it is still unclear just how much authorization North had to support the Contras 
there is little doubt the Reagan at least supported North's operation in general. North 
helped by hitting up friendly allies for funding for the Contras. Of course there were 
obvious implications that when Saudi Arabia donated a million dollars a month, later 
doubled, to the Contra cause that they expected some consideration in return. North 
also went looking for aid among private donors—primarily rich anti-communist 
crusaders.
The Boland amendment never bothered North, and it obviously didn't stop his 
supervisors McFarlane and Poindexter. He went about creating a resupplying 
operation through Richard Secord whose interpretation of the Boland Amendment is 
instructive:
The idea that Contra support was intended to be an illegal "end run" around the Boland 
Amendments, and not something painstakingly conducted in compliance with them, was a 
myth created later by the media and repeated so often that it eventually took on the color of 
truth. In fact, the legislative history shows quite the opposite.31
Secord, North, McFarlane, Poindexter, and others were all eventually charged and 
convicted of crimes in the Iran-Contra affair because they accepted such facile 
explanations or later sought to defend such actions during the cover-up.52 The most 
serious abuse of power in Iran-Contra was this attempt to create a private foreign policy
out of the reach of Congress. If Iran-Contra had succeeded or gone undiscovered 
future Presidents who disagreed with Congress could simply make an end run around 
the legislative branch.
The final aspects of Iran-Contra involved the crossing of two operations, a 
terrible idea under almost any set of circumstances. Since Secord and Albert Hakim 
had made some extra money off of arms sales in Iran they donated a part of it back to 
the Contra resupply operation which they were also running. When Eugene Hasenfus 
was captured by Sandinistas he spilled the beans on North and Secord's operation.53 
Shortly thereafter the Iranian operation came to light and then the last damaging piece in 
the puzzle, the diversion. The entire operation was eventually revealed in some detail 
and the Reagan administration was mortally wounded although Bush and Reagan 
managed to weather the storm without criminal charges by claiming ignorance. The 
scandal hurt the CIA by involving the U.S. once again in secret operations that went 
beyond the law, even if this time the CIA hadn't really been involved.
During all of this the CIA was largely relegated to the sidelines as required 
without Congressional funding. Little of the blame for Iran-Contra can actually be 
accessed as a CIA failure. Essentially Reagan used the National Security Council staff 
to conduct an unregulated covert war without the aid of the CIA. William Casey, then 
head of the CIA, was probably privy to the operation, but the CIA was not really 
involved. McFarlane asserts that Casey "was searching for an alternative basis for 
conducting covert operations in Central America," and that North and the NSC 
provided an off-the-shelf Contra support operation, however illegal.54 The blame for 
Iran-Contra rests with the Administration. The problem for the CIA with Iran-Contra 
would come about over the long term.
Beyond support for the Contras the CIA intended to make the economy scream. 
Many of the Contras' operations were explicitly aimed at causing economic damage that 
would further weaken the Sandinistas. This was so important that the CIA would
involve its own personnel in mining harbors and attacking coastal towns, "a CIA 
operation from start to f i n i s h . "55 Reagan's official policies dovetailed nicely with the 
CIA's operational aims. In May of 1985 Reagan declared a full trade embargo with 
Nicaragua though there was no "allied support for the e m b a r g o .  "56 The embargo and 
other actions, including pressure on the World Bank to end all loans to a struggling 
Nicaragua, helped to make the internal situation in Nicaragua worse. In the end it also 
helped to prove Washington's fears, pushing a military draft into effect to defend 
against the Contras and forcing Ortega to woo the Soviet Union since they were "the 
only outside source available to him for money and weapons to defend against the 
Contra military f o r c e s .  "57 Still much of the economic program was above ground. 
The CIA only specifically helped to damage the economy by supporting Contra 
operations intended to destroy key economic targets since the Contras at no time could 
actually wrest control from the Sandinistas by purely military means.
During the years of the CIA's operation up until 1990 possibly $100 million 
was spent specifically on internal opposition to the Sandinistas. These opposition 
groups included political opponents, religious leaders, and even La Prensa. 
Nicaragua's most successful newspaper received "covert funding not only from the 
Central Intelligence Agency, but also from the secret network coordinated by Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver North, the former National Security Council official and central figure in 
the Iran-Contra s c a n d a l .  "58 Domestic opponents of the Sandinistas were supported as 
well, and the CIA helped set up the civilian cover for the Contras at times even enticing 
former Sandinista supporters to serve on the Contra's political directorate. Indeed the 
most popular domestic opponent of the Sandinistas, Managua Arturo Cruz, pulled out 
of the 1984 election specifically to help invalidate the elections though he might have 
made "a formidable o p p o n e n t .  "59 Cruz had returned to Nicaragua to go "through the 
motions of being named the presidential candidate of the CDN and then of entering into
discussions with the government on the terms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , " * ®  in order to pull out 
and make the Sandinistas look bad, a decision he later regretted.61
Overall the operational goals were only met in 1990 when the Sandinistas were 
forced out by the ballot box. Though the goal was finally met, the main thrust, the 
Contras, were almost an absolute failure. Edward N. Luttwak, a chair at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, refers to the CIA's work in Nicaragua as 
"disastrous operational incompetence."*® The elections were arrived at not so much 
because of CIA pressure, but because of pressure from other Central American 
countries especially Costa Rica. Indeed most of the money for candidates came from 
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an open source. The NED provided 
about $12.5 million to the opposition directly, or about $ 8  dollars a voter, more than 
twice what George Bush spent per voter to get elected in 1988.*® And this in an 
extremely poor Third World nation. As a whole the CIA operation in Nicaragua was a 
failure.
Operationally all that remains is deciding how big a failure the Contras were. 
An ill trained army commanded by corrupt National Guard members—the Contras were 
a disaster. The CIA had to involve its own personnel in mining efforts and attacks on 
coastal towns, a development that eventually hurt the whole operation. The Contras 
never developed an effective political wing, and the final foreign policy came about 
because of election influencing where the CIA and the Contras played only a marginal 
role. All of this adds up to a nearly complete disaster in reaching operational goals 
giving the Nicaragua operation a -5 for operational goals.
Long Term Success
In the short and medium term the CIA operation was a general success. The 
Chamorro government upon winning instituted a Western style democracy. The
Sandinistas were defeated in an election generally conceded to be free and fair despite 
heavy United States aid to the opposition candidates. Notions of privatization were 
introduced immediately after Chamarro assumed office with dramatic effects. "In the 
first six months of the new government the economy suffered a dramatic acceleration of 
hyper inflationary tendencies. It reached an unprecedented average monthly inflation 
rate of 89 percent for the first six m o n t h s .  "64 One year after Chamorro's election, 58% 
of Nicaraguan citizens felt the UNO government had worsened the economic situation. 
Aditionally, more than three-quarters of the population expressed displeasure at the 
decline in health and educational s e r v i c e s . 6 5  Even early on there were problems.
In the medium term things were still going well for the United States, but cracks 
were beginning to show in the earlier glowing victory. Under pressure from the United 
States Nicaragua dropped its valid claim to war reparations stemming from the World 
Court decision in 1 9 8 6 .6 6  Chamorro was under quite a bit of pressure to leave 
Humberto Ortega, a Sandinista leader, as the head of the military. Some considered her 
to be giving "away a victory that had cost Nicaragua a decade of war and twenty 
thousand l i v e s .  "67 In effect the Chamorro government was not as well received as the 
United States had hoped.
In the longest term that can be effectively observed as of today, the final goal of 
removing the Sandinistas from power was largely achieved. A U.S. backed 
government sits in power today. Still there are nagging problems in the long term with 
the CIA's program of destabilization. As the new elections of 1996 approach there is 
some question as to how the UNO will fare.
First, the Sandinistas are by no means defeated as a political force. Within the 
Chamorro government they still wield much power and have a strong base in the 
military. They also maintain widespread political support. Some have argued that 
Nicaraguans were convinced to vote for the Chamorro government because it was the 
only way to convince the U.S. to leave Nicaragua alone. Essentially "the Contras, with
U.S. approval and at U.S. direction, became an active part of the US-organized anti-
Sandinista political c a m p a i g n .  "68 William I. Robinson, an investigative journalist,
spelled out the simple equation:
Because the Contras support the UNO, and because the United States sponsors both the UNO 
and the Contras, an electoral victory for the UNO will mean an end to the military war with 
the Contras. The UNO, by virtue of its relation to the superpower waging war against 
Nicaragua, will be able to achieve peace. A vote for the UNO is a vote for peace.®
Thus the Sandinistas may be able to return to power in the next few years with
substantial public support. The CIA itself seems to see some danger of communism in
Nicaragua. In its 1991 World Fact Book the Agency lists Nicaragua as containing
between 15,000 and 20,000 communists, though it does not list numbers of dedicated
capitalists, supporters of liberal democracy, or democratic socialists, groups that
probably have greater followings than c o m m u n i s m . 70
At least there is some indication that despite being defeated in the electoral realm
the Sandinistas are still a large popular force capable of returning to power sometime in
the future, most likely through perfectly legal electoral means. Only one year later
writing in the New Republic James LeMoyne states that "Chamorro is still simply
trying to maintain the imperfect peace that ended the open civil war. She has barely
begun the process of crafting a true democracy. "71 As well, the long term implications
of the operation are unknown. There are still a large number of former Contras in
Nicaragua and the country is in desperate economic straits.
The question also remains as to how the situation in Nicaragua would have
evolved without the massive intervention by the United States. Jim Wright, former
Speaker of the House, points out that a "negotiating process achieved what six years of
U.S.-financed militaiy intervention had failed to achieve. It brought peace and restored
d e m o c r a c y .  "72 Others point out that the Contra intervention forced the Nicaraguan
government to more extreme measures which would have been unlikely without U.S.
interference.
In the long run Nicaragua is not likely to have posed any real threat to the U.S. 
The only real threat was that of a successful demonstration. Nicaragua could lead by 
example to the rest of Central America. Essentially the threat that is always cited is a 
domino effect. If Nicaragua fell to socialists then El Salvador would be next and then 
maybe Guatemala or Houndoras. The Sandinista victory proved that dictators in 
Central America could be overcome by popular uprisings. Cuba had provided a similar 
example in 1959, and remains to this day a bitterly denounced enemy of the United 
States. Since the United States has consistently supported military backed regimes 
such as the one now coming under fire in Guatemala, the threat of demonstration may 
have been serious. Other attempts to oppose U.S. interests such as Panama and 
Grenada met with armed force. A successful Nicaragua may have led to renewed fears 
of uprisings in other U.S. friendly regimes. Obviously there was a fear that the 
successful revolution in Nicaragua would carry over to El Salvador, a place where 
"one learns that an open mouth can be used to make a specific point, can be stuffed 
with something emblematic; stuffed, say, with a penis, or if the point has to do with a 
land title, stuffed with some of the dirt in question," a place where body dumps "are a 
kind of visitors' must-do, difficult but worth the d e t o u r .  "7 3 With or without the 
intervention Nicaragua could pose little actual threat to the United States.
Finally, the whole intervention is likely to sustain anti-Yankee sentiment for 
some time to come. Essentially whether one supported the Sandinistas or not, the 
United States was heavily involved in violating Nicaragua's national sovereignty. It is 
also hard for the Nicaraguan population to see this as an ahistorical aberration since 
there is a long history of massive interference by the United States in Nicaragua. 
Though it is impossible to predict the effect of anti-Yankee sentiment, it helped fuel 
bitter enemies such as Iran and Cuba. Many observors believe that to this day Castro 
remains in power mainly because of U.S. hostility to Cuba. Castro can always point to
the evil United States and how he stands up against it, a strategy that has maintained his 
popularity in Cuba even now in a very difficult economic situation.
Since the long term effects are difficult to determine the operation is ranked as a 
zero. There is considerable anti-Yankee sentiment in Nicaragua and the Sandinistas are 
a powerful political force. Ranking will be easier after the results of the 1996 election 
that may return the Sandinistas to power. If UNO or another party can retain power 
then the long term effects may be slightly positive.
Covertness
The CIA operations against Nicaragua were never truly secret. While the Carter 
administration's early funding of groups opposed to the Sandinistas may have remained 
hidden, Reagan went out of his way to brag about the Contras. In Reagan's attempt to 
win over domestic opinion he approved "the public use of classified imagery on a scale 
unparalleled since the Cuban missile crisis, in a despairing attempt to try to prove the 
administration's c a s e . "74 Even special missions such as the mining of harbors became 
unearthed almost immediately.
The main thrust of the CIA's operation in Nicaragua, the Contras, was never 
much of a secret. Nor was the United States' role in funding their operations. Indeed, 
unlike previous large scale covert actions, the Administration engaged in debates with 
Congress about funding the Contras. Previous proxy armies such as the Meo tribes in 
Laos and anti-Castro Cubans had at least attempted to maintain some secrecy. Had the 
CIA been able to hide U.S. connections to the Contras the myth of the "freedom 
fighter" might have been more plausible. No one in the international community 
including allies really questioned whether the U.S. was behind the Contras.
Some of the CIA program and funding was kept more secret. Aid to opposition 
groups and organizations such as Nicaragua's largest paper, La Prensa, were largely
unacknowledged though there were significant rumors and allegations of CIA 
involvement. As it turned out the allegations were quite true. John Spicer Nichols 
reports in the Columbia Journalism Review on a year long investigation that "clearly 
shows U.S. aid to La Prensa was an integral part of a campaign to help the Contras 
overthrow the Sandinista g o v e r n m e n t . " ^  still even at the last minute reports emerged 
about the CIA funding of the 1990 elections. The U.S. had agreed to no covert 
funding of opposition candidates, but the CIA was secretly funding opposition 
candidates in explicit violation of peace accords. While concrete proof was never 
unearthed before the election the rumors turned out to be true. The CIA had run "a 
covert operation largely hidden from Congress that paid about $600,000 to some 100 
Miami-based Contra political leaders and organizers to return to N i c a r a g u a . " ^  The 
two intelligence committees weren’t fully informed of the program until after the 
elections and Senate Chairman David Boren felt that "he had been had."77 At the very 
least the CIA was able to keep much of the electoral and political interference from 
public view, a situation that never existed for the Contras.
The failure to keep the Contras covert was a serious mistake. Even though 
some of the election interference and aid to other groups were kept secret, rumors 
persisted that the CIA was involved. Also since the Contras were the main thrust of the 
operation their mistakes were especially costly. The United States simply could not 
deny it was behind the Contras. Under covertness the operation scores a -3 saved from 
a -4 only by the amount of undercover aid to Sandinista political opponents that went 
undiscovered.
Democratic Standards
U.S. foreign policy typically suffers from an emphasis on promoting 
"democracy." The mission in Nicaragua never met democratic standards, but that
would be hard to tell from Administration statements. The Contras were a force led 
mostly by ex-Guardsmen that were used to terrorize the Nicaraguan population. 
Elections were massively financed and influenced by the CIA including reports of 
attempts to sabotage the respectability of 1984 elections by pulling out a high profile 
candidate. International opinion was less then positive. Also since the U.S. role 
wasn't hidden it is difficult to defend. Still a Democratic House did vote to continue 
sending money to the Contras though ostensibly it was merely to stop aid flows to El 
Salvador, a goal that was of little use to the Reagan administration.
One of the greatest contentions was that the Contras were "freedom f i g h t e r s " ^  
who sought to restore democracy to Nicaragua. The Sandinistas were portrayed as a 
totalitarian communist group seeking to establish a new Russia in Central America 
"imposing rigid military rule and ousting the leaders of the other factions that had 
fought with them in the r e v o l u t i o n .  "79 Neither of these myths hold much weight.
The Contras were far from a principled group of revolutionaries hoping to turn 
their country into a democratic nation. Instead they were largely holdovers from 
Somoza’s National Guard, hated and despised by the majority of the population. The 
September 15th Legion from which the FDN was formed was a gang of petty criminals 
and mercenaries for hire. Their earliest exploits were "robberies, kidnappings, and 
deathsquad m u r d e r s " ^ ®  i n  Guatemala. While Reagan may have wanted to wrap the 
Contras in the cloth of true revolutionaries, the Sandinistas actually pulled off a popular 
revolution against Somoza.
Despite the rhetoric Nicaragua was not the totalitarian communist nation that 
Reagan imagined. The Sandinistas did consolidate power in the ruling junta after the 
revolution, but they were well supported by the population in general. Though an 
election was not held until 1984 "most observers agree that the Sandinista party would 
win any election held."81 Freedom of the press was retained although there were some 
restraints put on the shrill opposition La Prensa which received funding from the CIA.
Indeed the CIA funding of the Contras precipitated the state of emergency which 
brought about the most oppressive measures imposed by the Sandinistas. When the 
U.S. government pointed out things such as censorship and the draft under the state of 
emergency they failed to point out "that every government, no matter how democratic, 
has employed extraordinary measures in wartime, including the United S t a t e s . " ^  The 
Contras certainly helped to create these "totalitarian" aspects of the Sandinista 
government. If the Sandinistas were truly as evil as they were portrayed they would 
never have won the 1984 election, which was considered basically free and fair by the 
international community, and they never would have peacefully stepped aside as they 
did upon losing the 1990 elections.
The U.S. never followed democratic standards in the "secret" war against 
Nicaragua. Indeed the U.S. was willing to violate international law to such an extent as 
to mine Nicaraguan harbors. Once the case was filed against the U.S. in the World 
Court, the U.S. simply announced that it was ignoring the World Court's jurisdiction 
for two years, a move that clearly signaled U.S. guilt. In the name of fighting 
communist revolution and its export the U.S. clearly ignored democratic standards, 
massively interfering in the elections that were held. This policy of fighting 
communism at any cost including "dirty wars" had a long history, probably beginning 
with the U.S. intervention in the Russian revolution or the 1948 Italian elections. 
Nicaragua was merely a case of hypocrisy where the United States government claimed 
to be fighting for democratic ideals while constantly violating them. The overt nature of 
the operation merely adds to the true failure in Nicaragua. The operation scores a -3 for 
its total failure in even partially meeting democratic standards.
Efficient Expenditure
65
As mentioned earlier there was a large measure of corruption among the FDN 
leaders. Even non-Guard members got in on the act not the least being Eden Pastora, a 
former Sandinista leader. Pastora never established a Southern Front despite his 
championing by the CIA. All of the aid sent to Pastora made very little impact and with 
an attempt on Pastora's life the Southern Front broke up. Despite Pastora's popularity 
and authenticity as an opponent of Somoza, unlike the PON’s leadership of former 
National Guard members, by 1984, "the CIA, once so proud of recruiting Pastora, 
wanted nothing more to do with h i m . " 8 3  Members of the political directorate had their 
hands in the cookie jar as well. Basically the Contra politicians were shuttled around 
Congress in order to convince legislators of the need for Contra funding. Still these 
politicians were amply rewarded for their services. Calero the most important member 
of the directorate was not living off ideals. "Calero was wearing expensive suits, 
jetting from speech to speech, hobnobbing with America's wealthiest conservatives. 
Lawmakers could see what this "rebel leader" really was—a glad-handing 
businessman. "84 Many of the Contras best paid members would end up moving to 
Miami after the war.
From a standpoint of expenditures, the covert action in Nicaragua was relatively 
cheap, certainly cheaper then actual U.S. military involvement. Still quite a lot of 
money was spent in order to remove the Sandinistas. The bulk of this money was 
spent on the Contras who were an utter failure. The final victory was partially from 
exhaustion after facing the wrath of a superpower. And the Sandinistas were not 
completely removed from the picture because they still wield substantial power in the 
Chamorro government.
Largely overt election interference proved the final blow to the Sandinistas. A 
large part of this interference was completely in the open through the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED). Indeed William I. Robinson argues that the NED
has effectively taken over the old role of the CIA in rigging elections. Nicaragua was
just the latest example which goes back to three earlier success stories in the
Philippines, Chile, and Panama:
In both the Philippines and Chile, the goal was to remove U.S. allies, brought to or 
maintained in power by earlier U.S. interventions, whose continuation in office no longer 
served U.S. interests. The U.S. effort in these two countries intersected with indigenous and 
broadly based movements against dictatorial governments. In the case of Panama, the aim 
was to legitimize an opposition created by the United States after the existing regime fell out 
of favor with Washington and to build an international consensus in favor of military 
aggression. In Nicaragua, the goal was to remove a designated e n e m y  .85
If the CIA was not the key to the assumption of power by the UNO, then the
expenditure on the Contras was largely worthless. Still the implicit threat the Contras
posed was quite convincing to members of the Sandinista government. "Nicaragua
was worn down considerably as the result of w a r,"86 forcing the Sandinistas into
unpopular polices such as the universal draft
In the end the cost of the intervention, at least the CIA's part, appears to have
been wasted. Despite hundreds of millions of dollars in aid the Contras were never
capable of military victory. Much of the aid also went into the pockets of the corrupt
Contra leadership instead of the actual Contras in the field. Also much of the economic
pressure involved cutting off aid, enforcing a unilateral trade embargo, and pressuring
international agencies such as the World Bank to deny loans to Nicaragua. Finally, the
massive election interference was largely out in the open. While the corruption was
significant the foreign policy goals were met, and the Contras may have been part of the
reason for the electoral victory. Instead of rating the operation as totally inefficient
these mitigating factors give the operation a -2.
Benefit to Population
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The Contra war was a tremendous strain on an economy already in shambles 
from the end of Somoza's rule. While the country would probably not have recovered 
until 1983, with the Contra war it simply continued to fall. The Sandinistas made 
mistakes and productivity dropped off both because of Contra attacks and an overly 
centralized planning system. Though inflation was running at 35,000 percent in 1988 
the Sandinistas "were able to bring inflation under control without popular upheavals 
like those that rocked other Latin American s t a t e s . ' ' ^ ?  This was quite a feat considering 
the poverty of the country.
Still the guide to measure by is how the economy did after the Sandinista defeat 
and whether the population benefited. According to CIA figures GDP started at 1.7 
billion in 1989 and fell to 1.6 billion by 1991 a year after the Chamorro government 
was in power. Per capita income showed the same precipitous decline in 1991 falling 
from $470 per capita to $425 per c a p i t a . ^  in 1992  GDP grew returning to 1.7 billion, 
but per capita income remained low at $425 per capita.89 This coupled with a decline in 
spending on education and health shows a net loss for the people under Chamorro. 
Still this must be tempered with the difficulty of overcoming a decade of open warfare. 
At least under the Chamorro government the United States was willing to end its 
support for the Contras.
As far as the basic level of political violence, it has severely tailed off with the 
end of the Contra war and the election of the Chamorro government. Still there are 
some political killings both of former Contras and Sandinistas. Amnesty 
International's 1993 report also included some cases of abuse by the police including 
beatings of protesters .90 If one was to establish a baseline with the onset of operations 
against Nicaragua there would be some violations of human rights, but generally a 
pretty good record for a poor country. The general consensus is that most of the
abuses by the Sandinistas took place in the first few months of the new government. 
Hundreds of ex-National Guard members were the main victims. Most of the political 
violence was caused later by the Contras which means the United States was truly 
fostering much of the violence and lack of human rights in the country. Thus the lifting 
of the United States campaign of violence obviously improved human rights, since the 
Contras themselves were the main violators.
Nicaragua at this stage of its development can be considered a democratic 
nation. Though there are still flaws in Nicaragua's institutions, they have been able to 
hold two elections in a row judged free and fair by the international community. 
Opposition members are not outlawed or killed. By turning over power the Sandinistas 
helped to maintain the fragile democracy that had been threatened during the Contra 
war. The military has been maintained as subservient to the civilian government despite 
fears that Humberto Ortega would simply rule the country through the military as is the 
case in so many Latin American countries. The victory of Chamorro demonstrated that 
a revolutionary government could give up power. Chamorro has loosened restrictions 
on the press and political speech, though much of the restriction of these by the 
Sandinistas was due to a state of war. All in all political freedom has become more 
widespread with the end of the CIA operation.
The results of the Contra operation have yet to completely play out in 
Nicaragua. The population is suffering from an economic standpoint, but their political 
freedoms have increased. Adding together positive increases in political freedom with 
negative economic effects gives a score of 0. Further down the road it may be possible 
to access the full benefit or harm of the operation.
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Conclusions
Assigning the number values to the Nicaragua operation and its seven areas 
comes up overall with a -5 on a scale of -28 to 28. Each of the areas is accorded a 
value beginning with +7 to -7 for foreign policy goals and finishing with +1 to -1 for 
the benefit for the general population.
Table 3 Nicaragua
Foreign policy goals +7
Operational goals -5
Long term effects 0
Covertness -3
Democratic standards -3
Efficient expenditure -1
Benefit general population 0
Total for Nicaragua operation: -5
Overall this describes the Nicaragua operation as a mild failure given the criteria. While 
foreign policy goals were clearly met, very little else was clear in the Nicaraguan case. 
Also the CIA had only part of the role to play in the final victory by the Chamorro 
government, its classical election interference role absorbed by the overt NED. Thus 
the operation in Nicaragua was a failure as a covert operation.
Things are unlikely to change in the future with regards to the scoring of 
Nicaragua. Several factors could actually change for the worse in the next few years. 
Data will become available to better evaluate the progress observed for the general 
population. As well, the election of 1996 will be quite important in assessing the
longer term effects of the CIA operation. Should the Sandinistas return to power in 
1996 the long term effects would take a negative turn.
In the end Nicaragua was an expensive failure. Still the Chamorro government 
was able to grab the reins of power after ten years of covert warfare. The eventual 
success of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals were met at a very high price. The 
problem was that the CIA was asked to engage in covert warfare by means of a proxy 
army while the President talked about the connection on national news. The CIA was 
also ill used in the sense that many of its tasks had been taken over by overt means 
including overt election interference campaigns by the NED. Mining the barbors with 
its own personnel was a terrible miscalculation. While the Nicaraguan operation was 
underway the CIA was slowly evolving out of its Cold War thinking. Covert actions 
had been a way of fighting communism short of conventional war. The CIA held on to 
too many practices that had failed before in Laos and Iran—developing paramiltary 
operations without a political arm and promising continued support that would quickly 
be withdrawn as soon as the political winds shifted. Unlike the Nicarguan operation 
both those operations were developed primarily to keep costs high for the North 
Vietnamese and the Iraqis.
The operation in Nicaragua is an example of why the CIA's role needs to be 
reexamined and reconsidered. It is possible that the same results could have been 
achieved without the CIA's involvement, without ever having to support the Contras. 
Much of the intervention in Nicaragua was overt, ruling out the need for CIA 
involvement. The importance of the NED in winning the election may be a good 
example of how future interventions can take place without the dangers involved in 
covert actions.
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Chapter IV
"A Soviet Vietnam"
In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. had no long history of intervention as in 
Nicaragua. Afghanistan fell far outside the traditional sphere of U.S. influence and 
even outside the oil producing regions of the Persian Gulf which had become so vital to 
U.S. interests in the second half of the century. Afghanistan was a poor, sparsely 
populated country bordering the Soviet Union and Iran. Still the United States would 
be drawn into the conflict based on the containment notions of NSC 68.
The history of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan dates back primarily to the 
founding of Pakistan in 1947. Pakistan claimed within its borders an area inhabited 
mainly by Pushtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Due to this disagreement 
over honoring the Durand Line as Pakistan’s border Afghanistan "alone cast its votes 
against Pakistan's admission to the world organization. (United Nations)"! Eventually 
the border issue would push Afghanistan much closer to the Soviet Union. Pakistan 
found allies with Iran under the Shah and the United States thus necessitating that 
Afghanistan would be left to the Soviet Union. Indeed the Soviet Union became and 
"continued to be the major supplier of military and economic aid, and the dependence of 
the Afghan government on this aid was ever growing. "2 This close relationship with 
the Soviet Union is not unusual given its proximity to the superpower, indeed, it is 
unlikely that Afghanistan could have pursued a close relationship with the West.
Explicit communist influence began with the overthrow of Kin Zahir Shah in 
1973. He was overthrown by a cousin, Mohammed Daoud, who disagreed with the 
king's policies regarding border disputes with Iran and Pakistan. In staging this coup
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he was aided by the military where he found "much support among a large section of 
the military which he had modernized and equipped with Soviet assistance during his 
tenure (as former defense minister)."^ While the importance of Soviet trained officers 
in the coup is often cited as evidence that the coup was planned by Moscow, Selig S. 
Harrison argues that "subsequent events showed that he saw them as expedient, 
temporary allies who could easily be controlled or discarded when convenient. "4 Still 
the 1973 coup is seen as the first significant step towards the eventual Soviet invasion.
Daoud was generally a nationalist, willing to seek the help of the Soviet Union 
only to further his nationalist goals. After a time he moved away from the Soviet 
Union's sphere of influence seeking to be a truly non-aligned nation. He sought aid 
from oil rich Islamic countries and even came to terms with Pakistan over border 
issues. His course of action was fruitful considering the millions in economic aid 
received from both Iran and Saudi Arabia, still it was a dangerous course considering 
the proximity of the Soviets. Afghanistan as a poor Third World nation would always 
have to lean towards the Soviet Union even when claiming to be a member of the non- 
aligned movement. His dealings with Iran encouraged distrust among the Soviets 
which led Daoud "to lean ever more towards Iran for intelligence support, which in turn 
further strengthened the Soviet fears and distrust. Moving away from the Soviet 
Union would turn out to be a tragic mistake.
Soon after the 1973 coup Daoud had begun to move against communists in the 
government. He had appointed many of them to high posts, but it was not long before 
he "quietly started removing hard-line leftists from their governmental positions and 
shuffling around those whom he thought would not pose any threat."^ In July of 1974 
he removed two hundred officers who had trained in the Soviet Union.? Daoud's own 
coup had proved to the communist party leadership that a takeover was well within their 
means. As Daoud cracked down on the communists, Moscow was forcing them 
together. There were two rival groups within the party, the Khalq faction and the
Parcham faction. The Parcham communists had been those taken into the government
under Daoud. The Parcham communists were less orthodox Marxist-Leninist and
favored by Moscow. The Khalq faction and its leaders were seen as too headstrong
and ambitious by Moscow. While the Soviet Union was important in this decision to
unify the factions, "in the final analysis, it was their common fear that Daoud, with the
support of Iran and by turning to the oligarchic elite, was preparing for a final move to
destroy the leftist movement."** By moving strongly against the communists and
towards the West, Daoud had brought his own downfall.
The coup would come in 1978. A visitor to Afghanistan at the time Selig
Harrison describes the state of the country:
Looking back on the year preceding the Communist coup, I remember vividly the siege 
mentality that pervaded the Afghan government Daoud had drifted increasingly into the self­
isolation so characteristic of dictators. His insistence on unquestioning personal loyalty and 
total control over even minor administrative details drove many capable advisers out of 
government. While Daoud himself lived a austere life, corruption charges against his 
intimates, some related to aid transactions, cast a pall over his regime.^
The catalyst would prove to be the murder of Mir Akbar Khaiber, an old Marxist with
many connections to communist military officers. Two days later over fifteen thousand
angry mourners showed up for his funeral where top communist leaders addressed the
crowd. Soon after many party leaders were arrested including General Secretary Noor
Mohammed Taraki, but mistakenly a key figure, Hafizullah Amin, was only put under
house arrest. Amin simply passed the plans for the coup by his guards, and on April
27th, 1978 the coup began. A tank division and one wing of the air force participated
and soon the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the PDPA was in control. The
coup "succeeded with such a limited number of troops participating in the fighting,"
because the Afghan Army stayed on the sidelines waiting to see which way the winds
would blow.
Moscow's part in the coup had been minor. Kurt Lohbeck, a reporter for CBS 
News who spent extensive time in Afghanistan, argues that the KGB planned the coup 
in detail just two weeks before the actual coup. * 1 Rasul Rais counters this explaining
that it was planned by the leaders of the PDPA, adding that only "circumstantial 
evidence" of Moscow's involvement can be found. 12 Soviet involvement at any level 
was largely a response to events in Afghanistan. Obviously the Soviets would approve 
of any removal of Daoud especially by the indigenous communist party. Selig 
Harrison contends that Moscow had strongly advised against a coup, but that once one 
was underway they would not consider betraying the PDPA by revealing it. 
Moscow had a role in the coup, but only after being informed of it by the PDPA. After 
being informed Moscow waited and then quickly recognized the new government. Still 
in the years ahead Moscow would get much more closely involved in palace coups.
Taraki would assume the leadership of Afghanistan for only a short period. 
Before the PDPA could effectively consolidate its rule, a ruthless Amin would win a 
new struggle for power. The Soviets found Amin to be unreliable and dangerous. 
Amin attempted to erase the Parcham faction of the party, especially from positions of 
power. Pushing ahead with land reform and equality for women Amin angered the 
Soviets who saw the moves as "ill prepared, much too ambitious, and certain to 
provoke bitter opposition from rural vested interests, stoking the fires of a nascent 
insurgency that would be exploited by Pakistan and the United States to destabilize the 
new r e g i m e . "  14 During Taraki's rule Amin was in charge of a raid on the separatist 
group, Setam-i-Milli, that went terribly wrong ending in the death of the kidnapped 
American ambassador. The decision to launch the failed raid led to the end of 
meaningful relations with the United States.
Amin had emerged as the true power in the government. An insurgency by 
Islamic groups within the country was underway, and though it was not really a threat 
to overthrow the government it was significant. Taraki appealed to the Soviets to 
intervene with troops, but on March 20th of 1979 Moscow formally rejected the request 
for troops. After an uprising in Herat the Soviet government was convinced that the 
insurgents had actual indigenous support, and that Amin was going too far. In the
summer of 1979 Moscow began to circulate a plan of setting up a national "democratic" 
leadership in hopes of producing a government less offensive to the Afghan population. 
While communists would play prominent roles, Taraki would step down as president to 
be replaced by a non-communist.
Moscow would never get the chance to act on its designs. Amin seized power 
after learning of the planned coup against him. On October 9, 1979 Amin executed 
Taraki and took full control of the country. The execution almost certainly led to the 
final decision by the Soviet Union to intervene. Though the Soviets were forced to deal 
with Amin, he also relied almost totally on the Soviets to prop up his regime. At this 
point it was too late to make amends with Soviet leaders, and "neither his expressions 
of gratitude to the Soviet Union nor his professions of loyalty to the socialist 
Commonwealth earned him Brezhnev's affection."*6 Amin's rule would be quite 
short.
Amin's rule came to an end on December 24, 1979. The final decision to 
invade was authorized by Brezhnev despite reservations from many military leaders. 
Three days later "a special KGB hit team supported by Soviet airborne commandos 
assassinated President Hafizullah Amin, thus officially setting in motion the USSR's 
occupation of A f g h a n i s t a n . "  The whole operation was executed almost to perfection. 
As soon as Amin was gone Babrak Karmal was installed as the new president and 
quickly called for Soviet help, thus giving an official justification for the invasion. ̂  
The Afghan army had been disabled earlier by Soviet advisors who had claimed to be 
winterizing heavy equipment Installing their own puppet government allowed them to 
intervene with regular troops while claiming to be nobly protecting a neighbor from 
rebellion.
The West’s reaction was swift. The United States instituted a grain embargo 
against the Soviets and condemned their invasion as an act of brutality. Brezhnev and 
others had underestimated the response of the United States assuming that after some
hand wringing the United States would do nothing substantial. Carter was visibly 
upset when Brezhnev responded to a letter condemning the invasion with the response 
that they had not invaded Afghanistan, but merely been invited in. 19 Afghanistan 
changed Carter's mind set on covert actions according to Stansfield Turner, "thus it 
was that the Carter administration, despite its dedication to human rights and its 
considerable reservations about the morality of covert actions, turned easily and quickly 
to covert devices to respond to some of these despotic acts."20 Eventually the United 
States would spend over two billion on covert actions against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, making it the most expensive covert action in history.21
Foreign Policy Goals
The foreign policy goal attempted in Afghanistan was clear. It was to increase 
the stakes for the Soviets. More simply it was an attempt to turn Afghanistan into the 
Soviet Vietnam. Initially there was little hope of pushing the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan. The hope was that the United States could engage the Soviets covertly 
without involving any U.S. personnel.
Policy in Afghanistan was never as confused as policies in Nicaragua. The 
United States was quite clear about its support for the Mujahideen if technically stating 
a policy of noninvolvement. There was always public support for the operation. 
Unlike Nicaragua, the Afghanistan policy "enjoyed near-unanimous support from the 
American people and C o n g r e s s .  "22 The public supported the Carter, Reagan, and 
Bush administations' goals in Afghanistan despite knowing only the broad features of 
the operation.
Initially among Carter's advisors Brzezinski was biggest supporter of the policy 
of bleeding the Soviet Union. Stansfield Turner was not initially convinced that arming 
the Mujahideen would be more than an encouragement to commit suicide against a
vastly superior Red A r m y . 23 The United States had armed similar groups before 
encouraging them towards suicidal rebellions with promises of U.S. help. Early in the 
CIA's history the agency took part in an operation to help foster rebellion in Tibet 
against the Chinese communists.24 The operation was a disaster, one of few early 
failures for the fledgling CIA. Still with Carter’s enthusiasm for punishing the Soviets 
and Brzezinski's favoring of covert intervention funding for the Mujahideen pressed 
ahead.
The foreign policy goal was simply to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan. In the 
early stages there wasn’t much hope that the United States could turn Afghanistan into a 
Soviet Vietnam. "American policy aimed first, through clandestine arms shipments, at 
keeping the invading Soviet army from occupying the whole country and then at 
making the cost of "just holding on" so high that the Soviets would decide to bring their 
forces h o m e . "25 The eventual success of the Mujahideen was above and beyond all 
expectations. There was also major concern in keeping the Soviet Union contained in 
Afghanistan, not letting them advance into Pakistan or Iran. This concern would lead 
to the Carter Doctrine and the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Essentially Carter 
argued that the U.S. needed to quickly create an armed force that could respond 
instantly to events around the world, primarily this meant the Middle East. The Carter 
Doctrine was created to inform the Soviets that if they if they invaded Iran the United 
States would consider it an act of aggression and deploy troops to stop the Soviets even 
if Iran wanted no such help. The Soviets never crossed the line in the sand. Without 
the need for direct U.S. involvement, the Soviets suffered a humiliating defeat. From a 
foreign policy standpoint Afghanistan was certainly the most successful covert action of 
the 1980s.
Afghanistan is often compared to Vietnam. There are distinct parallels: 
invasions of sovereign nations, propping up of unpopular local rulers, underestimates 
of national liberation movements. Still there are important differences. In pursuing the
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war against the Mujahideen "the Kremlin has been much more restrained m i l i t a r i l y " 2 6  
than the United States was in Vietnam. The Soviets were never willing to commit 
much more than a hundred thousand troops in Afghanistan versus the United States' 
much larger commitment in Vietnam. The drain on the Soviet Union was significant, 
but it had little to do with the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.
George Kennan and others argue that the Soviet Union collapsed in spite of and 
not because of the foreign policies of the United States. Indeed Kennan argues in 
general that the "effect of cold war extremism was to delay rather then hasten the great 
change that overtook the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. "27 Diego Cordovez 
and Selig S. Harrison argue that those who accept the Cold War model and give most 
of the credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union to Reagan's policies can carry the 
Afghanistan interpretation to an extreme giving "the CIA’s covert operation in 
Afghanistan credit not only for ending the Cold War but also for bringing about the 
dissolution of the Soviet U n i o n ."28 So while Afghanistan was a brilliant foreign 
policy success, it cannot be considered a significant factor in the end of the Cold War.
In the final analysis, Afghanistan yielded an important Cold War victory. The 
initial goal was to simply contain the Soviets and inflict casualties. Instead the Afghan 
Mujahideen bled the Soviet military dry and drove them back across the border, by 
making the price of victory simply too high to maintain. For meeting U.S. goals the 
Afghan operation scores a +7. Initial foreign policy goals were exceeded in 
Afghanistan.
Operational Goals
The main operational goal in Afghanistan was to arm the Mujahideen and turn 
them into a significant headache for the Soviets. The CIA has converted many rebels
into proxy armies for the U.S. in the past, Afghanistan falling somewhere between the
Kurds in Iraq and the Contras in Nicaragua.
Problems crept into the Afghan operation early. Charles G. Cogan in an article
entitled, "Partner's in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan Since 1979," makes a long list
of the operational failures in Afghanistan:
Some accuse amateurs in the CIA of letting the infamous Interservices Intelligence Directorate 
(ISI) of Pakistan handle everything. ISI, the argument goes, gave most of the weaponry to 
the fundamentalists, who as was abundantly clear early on, were going to install a 
fundamentalist and anti-American regime in Kabul at the end of the war. ISI, notoriously 
corrupt, siphoned off a substantial portion of the weapons and either sold them or kept them 
for other battles, most notably in Kashmir and the Punjab. The CIA neither monitored the 
inflow of weapons nor arranged to get weapons into the hands of the good commanders in the 
field. Meanwhile, the main recipients of the arms~the political parties in Peshawar-were 
engaged in a brisk traffic in drugs, and Washington overlooked Pakistan's nuclear program 
because it did not want to antagonize an ally. And finally, the CIA was so unimaginative and 
so cautious that it was slow to provide the insurgents with non-Soviet (i.e. non-deniable) 
weapons, thus delaying for months, if not for years, the departure of the Soviets.^
Cogan admits that these criticisms of the operation are valid, but he argues that the
brilliant foreign policy success outweighs the operational problems since in the end "the
policy worked. "30 So despite a partially flawed operation the foreign policy goals
were indeed reached.
Pakistan was not the most pliant of American client states. Indeed in many past
operations CIA client states were quite friendly and reliant on the United States. This
was not the case with Pakistan. Carter kept levels of aid to the Mujahideen low
primarily because of "the coolness of his relation with General Zia, leader of the
strategic front-line state of Pakistan. "31 The Reagan administration reversed this policy
by actively aiding the Mujahideen. While the Carter administration had been snubbed
by Zia for offering only a $400 million dollar aid package, the Reagan administration
jumped in with quick support and a gentlemen's agreement to ignore Pakistan's nuclear
program. The Reagan administration simply "asked for and received a Congressional
waiver" of the Symingnton amendment which prevented the government from
supplying weapons to countries engaged in nuclear weapons p r o g r a m s . 3 2  Eventually
Zia would be rewarded with a three billion dollar deal and 4 0  new F - 1 6 A s . 3 3
Pakistan also insisted on handling the aid to the Mujahideen. This was 
primarily to keep the CIA from running an independent operation and to benefit by 
siphoning off some of the weapons. The amount of seized weapons was quite 
substantial:
As a matter of policy, the Pakistan military laid claim to a share of the weapons' flow. Zia's 
armed forces saw it as their right to appropriate weapons from CIA shipments and the CIA , 
in effect, condoned the theft as a sort of commission, as the way one does business with the 
government of Pakistan. It is believed that at least 20 percent of the arms and perhaps more 
than 30 percent were siphoned off from the supply pipelines.^
All of this was in addition to the massive aid program for Pakistan which was
essentially a bribe to let the CIA conduct the covert operation for the Mujahideen. In
essence Pakistan was double dipping. At one point in 1987 ISI's main ammo dump
exploded spectacularly. Both the KGB and Mujahideen were blamed as possible
culprits, but Kurt Lohbeck implies that the ammo dump may well have been blown sky
high to hide the skimming operation that the ISI was conducting. An audit was to be
conducted by the Inspector General's Office of the U.S. Defense Department, but the
explosion conveniently ended those p l a n s . 3 5
The operation was also run essentially by the Pakistanis. While the CIA
supplied arms and some intelligence, the Pakistanis did everything else. Pakistan's
military and secret intelligence (ISI) organized the Mujahideen parties, planned
individual missions, organized the refugee camps, and distributed the weapons.
Pakistan selected seven parties to represent the various Mujahideen Islamic factions:
National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), Afghanistan National Liberation Front
(ANLF), Movement of the Islamic Revolution (HAR), Islamic Party of Afghanistan
(Hikmatyar) (HIH), Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Khalis) (HEK), Islamic Society of
Afghanistan (JIA), and Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan (ITT). Even
within this system Pakistan played favorites giving over half of the aid to one group,
the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, led by Gulbiddin H e k m a t y a r . 3 6  Though this was the
worst group to support in the American view, General Zia hoped that "once
Afghanistan was rid of the Soviet invaders, Hekmatyar, by far the most religiously 
conservative of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders, was expected to set up an Islamic state 
of the type favored by Saudi Arabia and Zia u l - H a q . " 3 7  Obviously Pakistan was 
pursuing its own interests with the Mujahideen.
The Pakistanis were also in charge of the supply system whereby arms were 
shipped to the insurgents. After arriving in the country arms were transferred directly 
to the Pakistani authorities. From there the arms were divided up by the Pakistanis, the 
lion's share going to the more radical Islamic parties. Then they were transported to the 
Mujahideen commanders in the field. When they reached the commanders they would 
then be paid for mostly by the Saudi Red Crescent with Saudi funds. The commanders 
associated with the more nationalist parties would generally have to pay almost the full 
transport cost, meaning they would have to sell back a portion of the arms to pay for 
the shipment of the rest. By forcing non-Islamic parties to pay for almost total 
transportation costs, thereby forcing them to sell weapons, the ISI could then point to 
the corruption of these groups versus the well supported Islamic g r o u p s .  38
Opium also became a serious problem. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran had 
always been opium producing regions, but before the Soviet invasion they had not been 
a serious exporter of opium or heroin. By 1990 Afghanistan was second in the world 
in the production of both opium and h a s h i s h . 3 9  The drugs were not manufactured by 
the Soviet invaders, but rather by the Mujahideen. Indeed in the early 1980s the 
Mujahideen "used their new CIA munitions to capture prime agricultural areas inside 
A f g h a n i s t a n " ^  which were then planted with opium poppies. The poppies would be 
processed into heroin and sold for arms or money to Pakistanis who would smuggle 
the drugs out of the country or sell them inside Pakistan. By 1986 Pakistan was in the 
midst of a terrible heroin crisis with over 1.3 million addicts.41
The pursuit of opium also led to a less effective Mujahideen. Many 
commanders became caught up in turf wars over fertile opium regions. Indeed, some
became little more than petty drug warlords, more prone to fighting other Mujahideen
then the Soviets. One of the largest traffickers was Hekmatyar who received over half
the CIA's support by way of the ISI, an agency also involved in the drug trade. While
Hekmatyar would later gain control of the majority of the opium fields, during the war
he held a "complex of heroin laboratories at Koh-i-Soltan at the southern end of
Helmand just across the border inside P a k i s t a n , "42 with the help of the ISI. Heroin
moving through the ISI also just added to the corruption of the Pakistani intelligence
agency, which the CIA had entrusted to run the operation.
The CIA hurt itself by choosing to heavily support the radical Islamists. As
already noted, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan run by Gulbiddin Hekmatyar received
over half of the aid in weapons and money from the C I A . 4 3  Many accounts of the war
explain that the seven parties were supported on the basis of their effectiveness in
fighting the Soviets. Under this system the three major Islamic parties should have
been by far the most effective since they received approximately 75% of the American
aid.44 If this was a valid justification for the varied aid levels in the seven different
groups then certainly at least Hekmatyar’s faction should have received less.
Some observers of the Afghan war support the contention that the Islamic
parties were the most effective fighting forces, especially Hekmatyar. Rasul Bakhsh
Rais contends that Hekmatyar ran a "most effective guerrilla organization," but that he
was given "disproportionately large economic and military r e s o u r c e s .  "45 Barnett R.
Rubin argues that though the Islamic Party of Afghanistan was the "most disciplined of
the Islamist parties," Hekmatyar "consistently placed the long-term goal of Islamic
revolution above resistance to the Soviets or to the Kabul r e g i m e .  "46 Other observers
are less flattering. Marvin G. Wienbaum reports that:
Although a number of field commanders in Afghanistan were intensely loyal to Hezb-i-Islami, 
their forces were in fact neither the largest nor most effective. Oddly, ISI officials seemed 
more impressed with the frequent ruthlessness of Hekmatyar's leaders than with the scope of 
their fighting or accomplishments against Soviet and Kabul government troops. Given Hezb- 
i-Islami's limited popular base within Afghanistan, only with direct Pakistani support could it 
hope, after a resistance victory, to be a successful contender for power in K a b u l .4 7
And Wienbaum is not alone in his criticism. Abdul Haq, one of the most successful 
and respected Mujahideen commanders, told U.S. policy makers repeatedly that 
Gulbiddin was virulently anti-American, had no significant force within Afghanistan, 
had never won a large battle, and had no commanders of renown under him.4 8 
Hekmatyar was constantly blamed for ambushing other Mujahideen parties even in the 
midst of battle, and Edward R. Girardet described him as "ruthless, uncompromising, 
and d e v i o u s .  "49 Hekmatyar could certainly surpass Amin's exploits in his short term 
in office were he ever to come to power in Afghanistan. Alfred W. McCoy describes 
the CIA decision to heavily support Hekmatyar as "dismal."50 The CIA built 
Hekmatyar the largest Mujahideen army which he then used to establish himself as a 
drug lord, to attack other parties, and to try to establish an Islamic state along the lines 
of Iran, most importantly, following Iran's anti-American line.
In conclusion the operational goals were met though the operation itself was 
"far from flawless. "51 Corruption, drugs, and support for fundamentalists were all 
serious errors. Due to these problems the Afghan operatiion only recieves a +2 with 
regard to reaching its goals. In the end the operational goals were met despite 
numerous mistakes, chief among them an over reliance on the Pakistanis who 
practically ran the operation.
Long Term Success
In the short term the Afghan operation was an overwhelming success. The 
Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan in 1989 ending what Gorbachev had termed in 
1986 as a "bleeding w o u n d . "52 it was assumed that the communist puppet 
government would fall almost instantly without its sponsor. Still much as in Vietnam 
the Soviets pulled out while continuing to send tons of military equipment to the 
embattled Afghan army. An assault on Jalalabad near the Pakistani border was
supposed to be the first step in establishing a new government under the Mujahideen— 
Jalalabad would be the first capital of a new, free Afghanistan.
The assault on Jalalabad would prove to be a terrible disaster. The Mujahideen 
commanders were unable to unify the command structure resulting in uncoordinated 
attacks against Jalalabad. Political infighting continued, and the operation was pushed 
by the ISI, not the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen suffered heavy casualties and were 
unsuccessful at permanently closing the supply route from Kabul. The Mujahideen 
also hurt their own cause by "inflicting heavy civilian casualties and killing some 
prisoners, actions that strengthened the will of the garrison to r e s i s t .  "5 3 Indeed this 
"unsuccessful and costly Mujahideen attempt to capture" Jalalabad resulted in increased 
aid.54 Aid dried up after the Soviet pullout, but in an attempt to save face in the last 
days of the cold war the United States stepped up aid to the Mujahideen.
One of the most obvious contradictions in the operation was the support for 
radical Islamic factions of the Mujahideen. The Islamic parties were consistently 
supplied with the bulk of the arms, and the initial reason for not providing Stinger 
missiles was the general fear that some of the Stingers would end up in the hands of 
fundamentalist terrorists. Some like Angelo Codevilla and Kurt Lohbeck argue that 
their was no real danger in giving the Mujahideen Stingers. Lohbeck argues that since 
Iran was a Shii'a Muslim nation the Mujahideen would never hand Stingers over to 
t h e m . 55 Codevilla dismisses the CIA's warning about a possible diversion to terrorists 
as a "throwaway l i n e . " 5 6  Both Codevilla and Lohbeck give the Stingers credit for 
turning the tide of the war in late 1986, for Lohbeck it was "unquestionable" that the 
Stingers changed the course of the w a r . 5 7  in retrospect by 1986 the Politburo had 
already decided i t  was time to disengage from A f g h a n i s t a n . 5 8  The Stingers merely 
made the war costlier, but they were not quite the dramatic turning point they seemed at 
the time. Mark Urban implies that intelligence officers at the time thought the Stingers 
had made a huge difference, but that in reality the Stingers had little real military effect.
The Stingers probably helped most by increasing morale among the M u j a h i d e e n . 59
And the CIA's worries about Stingers ending up in the wrong hands seems quite
justified given the level of corruption in getting arms to the Mujahideen, and corruption
within the Mujahideen themselves.
The support of radical Islamists would eventually wind up with serious
repercussions for the United States. In 1993 the United States endured the bombing of
the World Trade Center. The blame would eventually fall on Pakistani-trained
fundamentalists.^ Elie Krakowski, an adviser to Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle, a rare critic of the policy of letting the Pakistani's have a free hand in
managing the operation, predicted that supporting fundamentalists would be counter
productive in the long term. Still as an advisor he had little effect on p o l i c y .  61 Even
liberal Pakistanis blame part of the Pakistan's problems with fundamentalism on the
United States since Washington "turned a blind eye to Zia's wider agenda while it used
him to arm the Afghan Mujahideen f i g h t e r s . " 6 2  in Afghanistan the CIA was willing to
support groups who shared the same philosophies and ideals as the government of
Iran, the Party of God in Lebanon, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Algeria.
It was a short term calculation that was bound to backfire. And the CIA had other
choices. Three of the recognized parties in Afghanistan were nationalistic parties who
did not embrace a revolutionary Islam. And even among the Islamic groups their were
more moderate factions, but the Pakistanis with reluctant CIA acquiescence allowed the
greatest part of the aid to be funneled to Gulbiddin Hekmatyar's faction, the most
radical and virulently anti-American of all the p a r t i e s . ^
The end of the operation did not mean an end to the drug problem within the
Afghan Mujahideen:
By early 1990 the CIA's Afghan operation had proved doubly disastrous. After ten years of 
covert operations at a cost of $2 billion, America was left with Mujahideen warlords whose 
skill as drug dealers exceeded their competence as military commanders. In 1989, as the cold 
war ended and the Bush administration's war on drugs began, Afghan leaders like the opium 
warlord Hekmatyar had become a diplomatic embarrassment for the United States.^
By supporting the Mujahideen in spite of their drug connections the CIA was 
complicitly involved in the heroin trade itself. Allegations against the Contras with 
respect to drugs had damaged support for the Nicaraguan operation. In the end, "the 
cultivation of opium and the refining of heroin in Afghanistan ultimately contribute to 
the drug problem in the United States, since at least part of the Afghan harvest will end 
up in the veins of American drug a b u s e r s .  "65 The long term effects of ignoring the 
opium production could be quite catastrophic.
Another long term problem is the CIA support for the Islamic factions heavily 
involved in the opium trade. In an effort to lower opium production USAID offered to 
give millions of dollars in aid if the Mujahideen would discontinue the opium 
h a r v e s t .  66 One opium warlord, Naseem Akhundzada, agreed to the ban in exchange 
for aid. Naseem’s followers controlled the important Helmand River valley, so the ban 
on opium production there was significant. In March of 1990 Naseem was 
assassinated by followers of Hekmatyar who controlled the manufacturing of heroin in 
Pakistan. Instead of attempting to create a new government in Afghanistan, Hekmatyar 
and his Islamic Party of Afghanistan were involved in drug wars. The problem 
continued to worsen with regards to opium production in Afghanistan.
One small footnote to the Afghanistan operation was the involvement of the 
BCCI. BCCI, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or more appropriately 
the "Bank of Crooks and Criminals International" as Robert Gates would later deem it, 
was heavily involved in the Afghanistan o p e r a t i o n . 67 Though BCCI would finally 
collapse in 1991, "the CIA transferred funds for weapons to the Mujahideen," through 
BCCI and "BCCI also helped the CIA, NSC, and other U.S. agencies supply weapons 
clandestinely to the M u j a h i d e e n . "68 The founder of the BCCI, Agha Hasan Abedi, 
was a Pakistani with heavy connections to the Pakistani government and military. 
Indeed, after the collapse of BCCI, "investigators found a check to President Zia from 
BCCI for 40 million rupees--$2 m i l l i o n . "69 BCCI in its final collapse had only $1.2
billion in assets that could be located out of some $20 billion in actual assets. Much of
the missing money was believed to been stolen and used to fund other covert
o p e r a t i o n s . 7 0  With the fall of BCCI the CIA was pulled into another scandal showing
it in a bad light. So by using BCCI the CIA had to suffer the negative publicity of
being heavily involved in a very dirty financial affair, and the possibility that the CIA
had used BCCI to finance operations without Congressional oversight or approval.
Finally, the situation on the ground in Afghanistan was a disaster. After the
collapse of the Soviet empire, Afghanistan reverted to its long held status as a forgotten
part of the world. U.S. aid dried up falling to only 6 million dollars between 1993 and
1994.71 Zalmay Kahalilzad sums up the situation in 1994:
Failing to win after almost a decade of war, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. 
Their failure may have contributed to the destruction of the USSR, but the success of the 
effort against them did not bring peace to Afghanistan. The war continued, first against the 
Najib government left behind by the Soviets; its defeat in 1992 finally brought the Afghan 
resistance groups-the Mujahideen-to power, but they have failed to govern the country and 
the war has turned into a brutal civil conflict fought not over ideological, sectarian, or ethnic 
differences-although these factors are part of the setting but over who should g o v e r n . ^
The capital Kabul lay in ruins, over 75% destroyed, a replication of Lebanon high in
the mountain p l a t e a u s . 7 3  The country was in tatters not only due to the invasion of the
Soviet Union, but also because of the Mujahideen the CIA had supported. The
Mujahideen that had never been forced into a unified political body. The Mujahideen
that had for some been more interested in harvesting opium than fighting the Soviets.
The Mujahideen that had been manipulated by the Pakistanis who had no interest in a
strong nationalistic, united Afghanistan. In the end the Mujahideen had tom their
beloved country apart
In the final analysis Afghanistan is a broken country. The United States only
wanted to raise the stakes for the Soviets letting "Islamabad use American aid leverage
to settle old scores with Afghan nationalist adversaries and to pursue its own strategic
objective of a Pakistan-dominated postwar A f g h a n i s t a n .  "74 Afghanistan has remained
a chaotic mess well supplied with U.S. weapons and battle hardened fundamentalists.
While the Soviets were driven out, Afghanistan will remain in dire straits for many 
years to come, and the U.S. can expect the Afghans to have an unwelcome impact on 
much of the Middle East and, at least in one case, the United States itself.
Considering the long term picture for Afghanistan a score of -4 is warranted. 
While Afghanistan has yet to launch massive terrorist strikes on the U.S. it has both the 
capability and the will. The World Trade Center bombing is already a significant 
warning. Opium production has had an effect on the U.S. heroin market driving down 
prices and creating more addicts. The only positive note about long term prospects for 
Afghanistan is that the situation could be worse. So far Stinger missiles have not been 
used in any terrorist attacks involving Americans.
Covertness
In a direct parallel to Nicaragua the covert operation in Afghanistan was run 
overtly. In the early days of covert aid the Carter administration could have plausibly 
denied helping the Mujahideen, but upon Reagan's assumption of office there was no 
question that the United States was aiding the Mujahideen. Angelo Codevilla, a well 
respected intelligence expert, presents the argument that "in the case of Afghanistan, 
presidents used covert action to run away from an i s s u e .  "75 The first public notice 
came with the announcement in 1980 by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana.76 Gregory 
Treverton refers to the operation as an "open secret, more unacknowledged than 
unknown. Codevilla argues that the operation in Afghanistan was kept covert in 
order to avoid the problems of winning support in Congress and with the public. It 
nicely avoided most of the usual restraints on presidential power. Still in the case of 
Afghanistan the decision to go the covert route, considering the amount of public 
support is troubling. Covert actions had passed into the realm of real oversight with
official intelligence committees; they were not the unrestrained instruments of the
executive that they had been for Truman and Eisenhower.
It is difficult to justify the need for keeping the aid program covert. At no time
did the Soviets not understand who was behind the Mujahideen's armaments, be they
Soviet models or not. It was obvious that someone other than Saudi Arabia was
involved with the Mujahideen, and Pakistani's role could not be disguised. If the target
nation of the operation knows who is behind the operation and U.S. citizens know who
is behind the operation, what gain is there in hiding the operation?
Gregory Treverton argues that the U.S. hardly needed to keep the aid program
to the Mujahideen secret. Obviously the secret was an open one, simply
unacknowledged. The reason articulated by Treverton was the need to keep Pakistan
happy since the Pakistanis "were prepared to support them but unwilling to be too
visible in doing so lest it antagonize its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union. "78
While Pakistan claimed to the Soviets to be doing little to help the Mujahideen, the
Soviets clearly knew the degree of Pakistan's involvement. Indeed the Soviets
launched raids on border camps within Pakistan, though Pakistan rarely made any large
complaint over the incursions.
Angelo Codevilla persuasively argues that Pakistan never really cared whether
or not the operation was covert. He states:
The question with regard to Pakistan is this: Is Pakistan's acquiescence in serving as a conduit 
for arms and other assistance for the Mujahideen based on the fact that the Soviet Union does 
not know that such assistance is flowing through Pakistan? That seems unlikely. Rather the 
Pakistanis cooperate because they are confident the United States will come to their aid should 
they be attacked by the Soviet Union. Since the Russians know this, they refrain from 
attacking. I suggest that the willingness of third parties to help in covert actions depends not 
so much on the secrecy of their involvement as it does on their assurance that should the 
action ever become overt, they will receive plenty of overt support.7^
According to Codevilla the answer there is no real reason to run the Afghanistan
operation covertly. The major contention that the Pakistani's insisted on secrecy does
not hold water. Whether the Pakistani's wanted the U.S. aid to remain secret or not,
they really only wanted assurances that the U.S. would come to their aid in the event of
a Soviet invasion. Pakistani insecurity was not the major reason for running the 
operation covertly.
Afghanistan was another case of a "overt" covert action. While using the CIA 
as a foreign policy tool, the administrations ducked responsibility. They neglected to 
pursue a course of action in full view of the public, which obviously supported the 
campaign in Afghanistan. Congress was certainly behind the program as well. 
Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, a member of the House Armed Services 
Committee and a member of the House Intelligence committee, heavily backed the 
Mujahideen hoping to "repay the Soviets for Vietnam."80 Congress also regularly 
increased aid to the Mujahideen beyond the administration's requests. Indeed pursuing 
a covert course of action may have hindered the Mujahideen early on.
Since the action was covert the CIA choose to supply the Mujahideen with 
Soviet weaponry, so that the rebels could claim it was captured. The Mujahideen 
would have to go without advanced U.S. weapons. The Soviet arms, "many of them 
obsolete,"81 were helpful, but more sophisticated heavy weapons would have been a 
greater help. When U.S. weapons were supplied the Mujahideen were successful in 
attacks on the Soviet army. Angelo Codevilla charges that "the CIA purchased old 
Soviet military equipment form Egypt and China, some of it in terrible condition, 
paying more for junk than it would have for good Western equipment, in order to 
maintain " c o v e r .  "'82 The covert nature was actually harmful in terms of arming the 
Mujahideen.
The case for covert action in Afghanistan was never convincingly made. 
Afghanistan could have easily been run as a overt operation, which for all intents and 
purposes it was. While the operation was hardly secret from the Soviets or the 
American public, it also made little difference. The Afghan operation is a fine example 
of how future covert actions can be run openly, possibly even without the use of the 
CIA. The Afghanistan operation certainly had public and international support, and
could not possibly be hidden from the enemy, so it should have been run openly, 
possibly by the Defense Department, in order that it could have been examined and 
critiqued fully in the public sphere.
Was covertness merely an excuse to hide the problems of corruption, drugs, 
and the Islamic ideals of our Mujahideen clients? Even if it was a cover for pubic 
debate in the end it was less a problem then in Nicaragua where the Sandinistas could 
expose embarrassing U.S. tactics, such as the assassination manual. In Afghanistan 
there was little to gain by exposing any part of the operation since it was widely 
supported and largely without controversy.
Afghanistan was an operation run openly. While significant details were kept 
hidden the broad oudines of the intervention were obvious to the Soviets, the U.S. 
public, and the press. The Afghan operation scores a -2 in the covertness category. 
While the lack of secrecy did not doom the mission it certainly didn't help.
Democratic Standards
The question of democratic standards is important for the CIA in Afghanistan. 
Mujahideen were more easily portrayed as freedom fighters than the Contras who had 
never been subject to a Soviet invasion and were plagued from the start by heavy 
National Guard influence. They were willing to fight a superior foe while suffering 
heavy casualties. The Mujahideen had more concern for the civilians of Afghanistan 
and the refugees who flooded across the borders. Living a Spartan existence they 
defied the Russian bear. The question of whether the Mujahideen would bring 
democracy to Afghanistan was largely ignored. As rebels they were never expected to 
win, and even if they did they were at least anti-communists who would get rid of any 
communist influence within the government.
Gregory Treverton assumes that there was never much concern with democracy 
in Afghanistan. Supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan "was a way to put strategic 
pressure on Soviet occupation of that country; given the character of the resistance 
forces, it cannot be said to be a way to bring "democracy" to A f g h a n i s t a n . 3 
Certainly once the Mujahideen showed that they were capable of actually winning, there 
should have been some concern with forming a government respecting of some 
democratic principles. Truly, there was never a large attempt to develop the seven 
Mujahideen parties into some sort of unified government. Eventually the situation 
would erupt into open civil war among the Mujahideen factions.
The Mujahideen were not a well organized military force schooled in the 
Geneva accords. They were hardened fighters who often performed summary 
executions on captured prisoners. Indeed the Mujahideen saw little need to keep 
prisoners alive who would only have to be fed and clothed. They had little use for 
Western human rights norms and often violated them. The CIA did little to try to clean 
up the Mujahideen, and the respect for human rights continues to be dismal in 
Afghanistan.84
In Afghanistan at least the government could be seen as completely illegitimate, 
backed by a Soviet invasion, a clear cut case of aggression, unlike Nicaragua. The 
problems came more with the Mujahideen who the United States supported. Instead of 
supporting more moderate factions, the CIA ended up supporting the factions that were 
most against some sort of democratic process. Hekmatyar's idea of a democratic 
republic was an Islamic state set up along the lines of the Ayatollah Khomeni's Iran.
For meeting democratic standards the operation scores a -2. Only the inherent 
righteousness of fighting off a foreign invader keeps the score from falling to a -3. The 
Mujahideen factions that were supported placed little worth in democratic values. They 
were willing to tear down the country rather then allow anything but a fully Islamic 
government from coming to power in Afghanistan. Considering that the U.S. had
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much better factions within the Mujahideen to support, supporting radical followers of 
Islam violated any idea of instilling democratic values in a future Afghanistan.
Efficient Expenditure
The operation in Afghanistan is the most expensive CIA operation on record. 
Over two billion dollars in arms and aid were fimneled to the Mujahideen, though some 
ended up in the hands of the Pakistani military and intelligence. Where did all the 
money go?
A significant portion of the munitions and aid were skimmed by the Pakistanis.
John Prados argues that:
The official neutrality (of Pakistan) creates a climate of graft on the Afghan supply lines, 
which amounts to more than just the "cost of doing business." The most optimistic 
estimates, from CIA sources, are that 20 percent of the aid is skimmed off. Some Afghan 
groups put that figure as high as 85 percent. The very existence of such a wide range of 
estimates indicates that there is little real accounting~no one actually knows what has 
happened to all the covert action money .85
Prados is not alone in his assessments.*^ Corruption was rampant in the Pakistani ISI,
and as the CIA decided to entrust the Afghan operation to the ISI they had to accept a
high level of corruption. Still the ISI was, according to the CIA, "the most efficient,
and the least corrupt, organization in Pakistan, a statement that probably raises more
questions than it a n s w e r s . "8? While corruption was to be expected in such an
operation with huge amounts of money involved, the level of corruption in Pakistan
was quite high. Many Pakistani generals made fortunes out of the CIA operation.88
While CIA operations, especially large operations like Afghanistan, entail
significant interaction with local or regional powers, often "greasing" the palms of
pliant officials, the Afghan operation was excessive. Not only did the Pakistanis
receive a huge aid package, which has now dried up with the Soviet pullout, but they
received highly advanced F-16s even over Israeli protest. In general this could be
assumed to be enough of a "bribe" to let the CIA operate within Pakistan. Still the
Pakistanis under military rule also wanted a large chunk of the weapons destined for the 
Mujahideen. On top of skimming weapons, Pakistanis were also involved in the 
Mujahideen's drug trade buying raw opium or semi-processed heroin. Their most 
favored Mujahideen party, Hekmatyar's, was heavily involved in the heroin tra d e d
In the end the Pakistanis skimmed at least 20 percent of the arms and aid from 
the Afghanistan operation.^® While this is a conservative estimate, it still means that 
approximately $500 million ended up in the hands of corrupt Pakistanis. This seems an 
outrageous figure for a CIA operation where accounting is generally accurate, and 
payoffs to local officials are small. Since the running of the Mujahideen was handled 
largely by the ISI, the CIA was left out in the cold, hoping only that the bulk of the 
weapons would make it to the Mujahideen. From a spending standpoint the Afghan 
operation rates a -2. From a standpoint of spending, the Afghan operation was 
extremely inefficient and corrupt.
Benefit to Population
The population of Afghanistan is worse off today then before the Soviet 
invasion. It is less a sovereign nation than a collection of tribes and factions battling for 
supremacy. Taking stock of the situation within the country in 1994 Asian Survey 
concludes that "economic and humanitarian conditions worsened for the Afghans, 
especially for residents of Kabul and for refugees. "91 Despite a massive aid program 
to the Mujahideen throughout the 1980s Afghans are worse off today.
After the Soviets pulled out, Afghanistan soon returned to being just another 
backward nation nestled in some unimportant comer of the world. Aid dwindled 
precipitously, and success only hurt the Mujahideen in terms of U.S. aid. Afghanistan 
became a casualty of the rapidly warming Cold War. The CIA itself claims that 
"although reliable data are unavailable, gross domestic product is lower than 12 years
ago because of the loss of labor and capital and the disruption of trade and transport."92 
Obviously economically Afghanistan is far worse off even after the Soviet pullout. Per 
capita GDP is an estimated $200. Still the blame for Afghanistan's situation can be 
leveled on the Soviet Union rather then the CIA.
As for political violence, it has only escalated since the Soviet pullout and the 
fall of the communist government. Kabul lies in ruins, the result of warring factions 
willing to fight for political domination at any cost Freedom House ranks Afghanistan 
among those nations most lacking in freedom pointing to the intolerance of the 
Mujahideen groups and leaders with their insistence on Islamic principles and laws. 
According to Freedom House there exists credible reports that tens of thousands have 
been killed since die fall of the communist government93 Freedom House is joined in 
its assessment by other human rights monitors. The World Human Rights Guide for 
1992 reports that human rights are "widely violated" within Afghanistan.94 Human 
Rights Watch even reports that the United States is tied up in "indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians."95 Some of the inaccurate rockets that are used to bombard cities like 
Kabul were provided by the Iraqi government courtesy of the United States and Saudi 
Arabia. After capturing large amounts of weapons in the Gulf War the United States 
simply passed many of them on to the Mujahideen.96
Afghanistan, today, is a violent place without any stable political order or 
general respect for human rights. A decade of war with the Soviets could have led to a 
triumphant victory. It could have led peace at last for the civilian population. Instead 
Afghanistan is a disaster. The population is worse off after the operation from any 
standpoint earning the operation a -1 score for benefit to the population. Afghanistan is 
a tragedy.
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Final Conclusions
Afghanistan scores a -2 on the scale. This makes Afghanistan a mild failure as 
a covert action according to these criteria.
Table 4 Afghanistan 
Foreign policy goals: +7
Operational goals: +2
Long term effects: -4
Covertness: -2
Democratic standards: -2
Efficient expenditure: -2
Benefit general population: -1
Total for Afghan operation: -2
Clearly Afghanistan was a major foreign policy success. It was less clear in almost 
every other area. The only other positive score is given to operational goals. There 
were numerous flaws in the operation, not the least being handing over control of the 
Mujahideen to Pakistan. Still, the Mujahideen, armed with CIA weapons, did fight off 
the Soviets. Then the picture becomes less rosy. In every other category the operation 
gets a negative score. This is generally due to the present state of Afghanistan caused 
in part by the CIA support for the most radical Islamic factions, many of which were 
involved in corruption and drugs.
In the future there is little likelihood of any change. Afghanistan is not 
threatening to form a stable democratic government in the near future or even a stable 
government. The situation for the general civilian population is unlikely to improve
101
significantly, especially since the local warlords are now armed to the teeth with 
advanced weapons. Afghanistan despite throwing off the hug of the Russian bear is 
unable to advance beyond the status of the poorest of countries, indeed ranking first in 
infant mortality worldwide. And in the end the fundamentalist Mujahideen may come 
back to haunt the United States and its allies as terrorists well bred with a hatred of 
Washington.
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Chapter V
Agency without an Adversary
The reason for examining Nicaragua and Afghanistan was to use these case 
studies to make an informed evaluation of the CIA after the Cold War. The CIA is now 
under harsh examination. Created in the crucible of the Cold War the Agency is now 
fighting for its life. Everything is being reconsidered from intelligence analyzing to 
counterintelligence to covert actions. The focus of this study is covert actions as 
defined in Chapter H  After looking at the proposed reform plans the case studies will 
be reexamined adding important evidence in favor of certain reform plans.
The precursor to today's examinations of the CIA' took place in the mid 1970s. 
By the mid seventies the CIA had lost the sterling image of a young agency boldly 
fighting the Cold War. The golden age of CIA operations had passed with the 1950s, 
and Vietnam was winding down. Instead of the successes of Iran and Guatemala, there 
were the failures of Cuba and Chile. After Watergate and the exit of President Nixon, 
the next target of a reform minded Congress was the secretive CIA.
Congress would eventually form two committees to look into the CIA. The 
Pike committee in the House returned a scathing condemnation of the Agency. 
Embroiled in controversy, the committee's final report was suppressed by the full 
House and was leaked to the Village Voice. The Church committee in the Senate also 
released a report highly critical of the Agency, but in the end neither committee 
recommended that the Agency be abolished. The Church committee, more respected 
then the Pike committee despite its own share of controversy, had its final report 
released and gained support for reforming the Agency. * In that report the committee
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did not decide to preclude all future covert actions even though that option was strongly 
considered. Many of the Church committee's suggestions were enacted into law.
The Year of Intelligence resulted in the formation of two oversight committees 
on intelligence one in both the House and Senate. The Year of Intelligence also resulted 
in a significant reduction in covert actions. President Ford announced an executive 
order banning assassinations as well as the planning or the conspiracy to commit such 
deeds, while the Carter administration drastically cut back on covert actions. Carter 
appointed former Admiral Stansfield Turner to head the CIA. Turner made deep cuts in 
the covert side of the agency, some even called the cuts a massacre which gutted the 
agencies covert and human intelligence capabilities. Congress under Carter had few 
problems overseeing covert actions. When Carter later stepped up covert actions 
Congress remained friendly to the president's wishes even after a failed attempt to save 
hostages in Iran. Oversight remained a friendly process until DCI Casey. Casey 
would embroil the Agency again in controversy over Nicaragua and Iran-Contra. 
Congress would look at the CIA and point out needed reforms. Now that the Soviet 
Union has faded from the scene Congress is, once again, investigating the CIA.
End of the Cold War
Though the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of history as Fukayama 
would insist, it does have significant effects on the international scene.2 For the U.S., 
its sworn enemy is now merely a defeated friend after more than four decades of 
indirect hostility. It also leaves the United States as the lone superpower and the UN as 
a more powerful enforcer of international norms. Most importantly, it calls for a 
complete reexamination of the country's national security apparatus.
The Central Intelligence Agency was a creation of the Cold War. The agency 
became a "third way" to fight the Soviets, a middle road between diplomacy and open
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warfare. Retired CIA officer Theodore Shackley refers to the term as the "third 
option," an option he advocates.^ It appeared too dangerous to engage the Soviets 
directly. In the worst of scenarios a confrontation would mean nuclear war. Therefore 
the Agency would attempt to engage the Soviets.
The Cold War also meant a tremendous amount of spending on national 
security. Indeed the term national security began to expand. Soon almost any 
spending could be justified in terms of national security.^ Today items ranging from 
"Star Wars" research to economic espionage by the CIA are defended as essential to 
national security. Still much of this emphasis on national security relied on the Soviet 
Union as the supreme threat; drug lords and small time dictators no longer provide the 
implicit threat of destruction. The emphasis on defense and related spending is certain 
to decline, especially now that the United States has moved into the role of a debtor 
nation and has significant economic competition in world markets from Germany and 
Japan.
The end of the Cold War means an end to almost unlimited defense spending.
In a country with trillions of dollars of public debt, there is little room for a heavily 
funded intelligence sector. The CIA will face budget cutting as will the entire military. 
Indeed the CIA's budget has been shrinking with the decline in the defense budget. 
Though CIA directors such as James Woolsey have continued to try to hold off budget 
cuts, they are coming. ̂
Reform the 5 Paths
With the end of the Cold War, the CIA is once again under the unwelcome glare 
of public examination. Scores of articles on reforming or even terminating the CIA 
have been written in newspapers and popular magazines. In the halls of Congress 
Senators and Congressmen have called for reform. The basis of all this attention is that
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the central protagonist of the CIA, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. Since the Soviet 
Union was the basis for much of the CIA's work, what need is there for it now? It 
would seem to be a perfect time for reexamination.
Much of the discussion of the CIA's role revolves around intelligence. There 
are many expectations of a billion dollar intelligence agency such as the CIA. Failures 
in recent predictions such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have led to harsh criticism, 
especially as the CIA is being expected to get by with less money. And according to 
members of Congress the cuts are still on the table. The former chair of the House 
Intelligence Committee stated in the spring of 1994 that "if the agency expects the CIA 
authorization bill to reflect the status quo of pervious years, it has to have another 
thought coming. "6 The single greatest intelligence failure by the CIA has been the 
failure to predict the downfall of the Soviet Union. With all of the intelligence focused 
on the Soviet Union the CIA missed the boat. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan puts its, 
"for a quarter-century, they told the president everything there was to know about the 
Soviet Union, excepting the fact that it was collapsing. They missed that detail. "7
There are many critiques of the agency in its present form. Some suggest that it 
is an agency without an adversary, an agency that should be regulated to the dustbin of 
history with other Cold War relics. Others argue that while the need for covert actions 
has lessened greatly, there is still a need for the intelligence collecting and the analytical 
side of the agency. Some even argue that in the times ahead the CIA will need to be 
expanded to combat a myriad of new threats from drugs to terrorists. From the 
perspective of covert actions these future plans for the CIA can be broken into five 
groups. First, are those who would like to see the CIA expand its role moving into 
more covert actions against varied threats such as terrorists or drug cartels as well as 
moving into the realm of economic espionage. Second, is the group who would leave 
the CIA alone despite the end of the Cold War. Third, is the group who would slightly 
reform the CIA and drastically cut back on the large scale covert actions, especially
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paramilitary actions. Fourth, the group who would break up the CIA along operational 
and intelligence gathering lines, leaving covert actions generally to the Pentagon. Fifth, 
is the group who would call for an end to covert actions or even an end to the CIA. 
Covert actions would not simply be moved to another agency, but dropped altogether 
while entertaining the possibility that overt operations could still be carried out by the 
military or other agencies like the State Department. All of these five groups have 
significant arguments.
Retaining the CIA in a New More Dangerous World
There are arguments lodged at the end of the Cold War that the world is now a 
vast, dark room haunted by ghosts and phantoms. In a bipolar world the threats were 
simple, but now threats can erupt from anywhere. While implying that the Cold War 
was "the "best of all worlds" may be an exaggeration; bipolarity did offer important 
advantages to the American intelligence community. "8 It afforded the United States the 
luxury of throwing all intelligence resources at one large target, the Soviet Union. 
According to James Woolsey, former DCI under President Clinton, "we have slain a 
large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of 
poisonous snakes. "9 In this new post-Cold War world the CIA has many new, smaller 
enemies.
This school, which includes a large number of CIA personnel, argues that the 
CIA needs to look at expanding the intelligence role as well as the possibility of 
expanding covert actions. Its defenders see the need for increased spending on the CIA 
to offset reductions in military s p e n d i n g .  10 They want more spending on the CIA in 
human intelligence as well as technical intelligence. 11 The agency has found new roles 
to play as well. In the future the Agency will be involved in combating drugs, nuclear
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proliferation, terrorists, and possibly even economic espionage. Still many critics see 
this as an attempt to justify its own existence. 12
Given the CIA's record in dealing with drug traffickers, is it really a good idea 
to let the CIA get involved in stamping out drugs? A case can be made that the CIA 
"needs to spend less time around the honey pot of narcotics, not more." 13 The golden 
triangle became the world's largest opium producing region during the Vietnam war. 
One of the leading drug traffickers in the region is General Vang Pao, the leader of the 
CIA's Laotian secret army. The golden crescent largely within Afghanistan has become 
the second largest opium producing region. One of the leading traffickers there is 
Hekmatyar, a the CIA supported leader of one Mujahideen faction. The CIA has also 
allegedly been involved with other groups who were dealing in illegal drugs including 
the Contras in Nicaragua. So trying to move the CIA into a new role of drug enforcer 
is quite a change from the Agency's general policy of looking the other way. Is the 
whole argument of giving more funds to the CIA merely a argument to save the CIA 
bureaucracy from budget cuts?
Essentially the creation of new tasks for the CIA is an old fashioned tactic of 
any bureaucracy, the need to find a new mission to justify the its existence. Roger 
Morris, a former NSC official under both Johnson and Nixon, initiated the attack on 
the CIA's new justifications for existence. In a New York Times' article Roger Morris 
wrote:
To preserve and extend that expanding domain while much of its rationale disappears, the CIA 
has begun to advertise new perils of the post-Cold War period-international narcotics, 
terrorism, industrial espionage, even the spread of chemical weapons. In each field, however, 
the agency's own performance has been inept if not worse...[On reform plans] Like high 
priests railing at an end to superstition, the professionals will call such a plan heresy, 
impossible. If only they could tell us that the danger were really gone, they have always said. 
Only then could we change this obese, tunnel-vision relic, slouching toward Capitol Hill for 
still more money, still more ominous briefings on a world already past. 14
It is a harsh criticism of the Agency, but possibly a valid one. Obviously the CIA was
not created to operate in a world without the Soviet Union. In an effort to find a new
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worthwhile bogeyman, the CIA may be doing the country a disservice. 1  ̂ still the new 
arenas for the CIA are valid concerns even if the CIA is not the right agency for the job.
Many critics of the Agency acknowledge that some of its new tasks are valid. 
While agreeing the drug mission is not a valid mission for the CIA, since "its officers 
neither like it nor are they particularly good at it," Loch Johnson argues that they can 
play an effective role combating terrorism. 16 Since counterterrorism relies heavily on 
intelligence it is a natural area for the CIA to expand into according to Johnson. Still 
how large a role this will be for the CIA remains to be seen. Terrorism, despite the 
bombing of the Oklahoma federal building and the World Trade Center, is a rather 
small concern compared to keeping track of the Soviet Union and all of the KGB 
i n t r i g u e s .  17 in 1989 only 35 Americans were killed abroad by terrorists. 18 Spending 
billions on counterterrorism may be unjustified given the current level of the threat
Roy Godson, a long standing defender of the CIA, argues that these critics of 
the CIA's mission are damaging, perhaps fatally, the CIA's covert action capability. 
Godson accepts the thesis that covert actions are a justifiable tool of statecraft. He 
refers to the mood of CIA critics today as "exceptionalism." Exceptionalism "holds that 
covert action should not be engaged in unless there are grave and unusual 
circumstances—the definition of which varies from one exceptionalist to another." 19 
He divides the critics into two schools, those who disagree generally with the 
compatibility of covert actions and democratic rule and those who regard covert actions 
as a third way between diplomacy and open warfare. Godson argues that both of these 
positions are wrong. Covert actions should only be undertaken when there is a clear 
policy behind them. The early years of the Cold War demonstrate how covert actions 
can be properly conducted.
As the United States emerges from the Cold War, Godson sees a dangerous 
predicament. If the U.S. does not heed the warning signs it could be in for an 
unwelcome fate:
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Letting counterintelligence and covert action capabilities lapse may not prove fatal, given the 
advantages the United States enjoys today with respect to the world's other powers. 
Nevertheless, diminished counterintelligence and covert action capabilities raise the cost of 
exercising that advantage by reducing the tools a president has on hand to address national 
security problems, short of waging war. Moreover, American dominance is unlikely to go 
untested forever; the Hitlers and Stalins of the world have not vanished with the end of the 
twentieth century. When the test does come, a weak U.S. counterintelligence and covert 
action capability could be much more than a mere hindrance. It might prove a catalyst for 
disaster-as it has for many others throughout world history .20
It is indeed a dire warning. If the United States lets its covert actions capabilities lapse,
as it did to some extent in the last half of the 1970s, the country could fall under the
boot of some modem day Hitler. Still the U.S. successfully survived the downsizing
of covert actions under Carter and retooled quickly enough to launch two large scale
covert actions in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Currently covert actions have lapsed
again; no shadows of any large scale program have emerged. Godson argues that the
current trend towards de-emphasizing the role of covert actions is wrong, an arguable
position, but his contention that the United States could collapse due to a lack of covert
action capability and counterintelligence appears to be overstated.
There is an honest fear that the post-Cold War world may be dangerous enough
to justify an enhanced intelligence agency.21 Many also see problems in the Gulf or
the former Yugoslavia as areas where covert actions can be pursued without the fear of
Russian interference. An argument can be made that increasing economic espionage
can have dramatic benefits for U.S. business. But if all of these programs were so
useful, why were they not conducted during the Cold War? The CIA often overlooked
drug production and dealing, made little noise about nuclear proliferation in Israel and
Pakistan, and helped arm terrorists such as the Contras. Obviously it is quite favorable
for the CIA to find new missions now that it is without an adversary.
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Status Quo
A second school argues for largely keeping the CIA intact with some minor
reforms. This school is well reflected by former DCI Webster. They are differentiated
from other critics who largely defend the agency, but hope for a very minor role for
covert actions. Webster, typical of a bureaucratic chief, argues for slow reforms, but
that nothing is essentially wrong: "as far as covert action [is concerned], I've tried to
make this point: the procedures are already there. We need only people who will follow
the procedures ... I believe very firmly in maintaining a covert-action capability in this
a g e n c y . " 2 2  Essentially the argument here is that despite some problems, the CIA has
been largely on the right track all along.
Defenders of the CIA argue that the large scale reforms being suggested go too
far. And outright elimination of the CIA is simply beyond the pale. Samuel B. Hoff, a
professor at Delaware State University concludes:
The Central Intelligence Agency should be trimmed down, not put down; it must retain its 
traditional concentration on analysis and operations in the international sphere, not at home; 
and it must train able and honorable personnel who share a commitment to advancing our 
country's interests while adhering to laws, cultural norms, and accepted practices. In this 
manner, the CIA can facilitate congruence between the purpose and outcome of foreign and 
national security p o l i c y  .2 3
There is nothing significantly wrong with the CIA according to Hoff. The CIA should
be trimmed down since there is less money in the budget and because the Soviet Union
has disappeared. Past offenses or even recent ones such as Nicaragua and the "failure"
to predict the invasion of Kuwait merit only new attention to high standards. If the
agency's personnel can learn to closely follow high standards, the past failures will
largely evaporate. What is needed is merely an emphasis on good management.
One Agency defender, John Horton, argues against many of the suggestions to
radically alter the agency. He states that while it might be tempting to take operations
out of the CIA and put them in some other agency, it would never work. It would be
dangerous because the personnel would have nothing better to do than to justify their
own existence, by pushing for more and more covert actions. It would be "so 
expensive that neither the executive nor the Congress would abide by it. "24 Finally, 
the United States should not make the mistake of separating the two clandestine 
services as during the days of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). There were 
chronic battles between the CIA and the OPC "over personnel, salries, and status"25 
and difficulties arising from having covert actions run by two different agencies. The 
CIA staffed and housed OPC while having no control over them. This difficult 
situation continued until 1952 when the OPC was brought under the CIA's authority. 
In the end, only the historical argument is convincing, Horton's protests about the cost 
of a separate organization and the fear that it would always be plotting to increase covert 
actions, could be applied equally well to today's CIA.26
Many in this school worry that cutting back on covert actions would mean that 
the U.S. would only be able to respond to situations with diplomacy or all out war. 
While conceding that "many activities that would have been conducted covertly will be 
conducted in an overt or semi-overt manner," Andrew C. Tuttle worries that this new 
situation for covert actions is dangerous since they are "essential to the security interests 
of the state. "27 The Carter administration's de-emphasizing of covert actions before 
the Afghanistan invasion is often cited. Some argue like John Ranelagh that by de­
emphasizing covert actions, the United States will be repeating a failed experiment that 
took place under Carter and Turner. When covert actions were played down, the 
United States looked weak and had little option in responding to events such as the 
hostage crisis in Iran. Ranelagh even attributes part of Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory 
to an electorate disturbed by the emasculating of the CIA.28 Thus the United States 
should never abandon the covert action tool, nor regulate it to only occasional use under 
rare circumstances.
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Moderate Reform
A common argument in reforming the CIA centers around covert actions. 
Couldn't the agency simply de-emphasize covert actions? George Ball, a member of 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, believes that "in principle, we ought to 
discourage the idea of fighting secret wars or even initiating most covert a c t i o n s .  "29 
Even members of the CIA have often wished that covert actions were not a part of the 
Agency's m i s s i o n . 3 0  In particular members of the intelligence directorate commonly 
rail against the "cowboys" in operations who constantly embarrass the entire Agency. 
Indeed Clark Clifford, who helped draft the legislation creating the CIA, explains that 
the Agency has drifted off course away from "the original concept of an intelligence- 
coordinating a g e n c y .  " 3 1  Many would like the CIA to return to its original emphasis 
even if covert actions are retained.
Another argument in favor of reducing covert actions centers around the ethics 
of such ventures. While the Cold War justified many unseemly activities, the basis for 
engaging in these acts now has significantly lessened. According to the Doolittle 
Committee, a committee formed by President Eisenhower to make recommendations on 
covert actions, since the Soviet Union was willing to use almost any means to destroy 
the West, "acceptable norms of human conduct do not a p p l y .  "32 Without the Cold 
War, these acceptable norms of human conduct should again be applied to covert 
actions. Seen in this light, policies that are without public support and involve extreme 
measures are unlikely to be approved. Nicaragua is an example of one operation that 
would be extremely difficult to justify without the Cold War setting, even then the 
operation was highly controversial. Chile is another that seems unlikely to occur again 
today, especially the excesses of Track II which involved even assassination plots. On 
the other hand, an operation such as Afghanistan could still be supported, possibly with
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some modifications. Still many contend that despite the new heightened ethical 
concerns some covert operations would be approved.
James Barry, a Deputy Director of the CIA's Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, states that some covert actions can still be justified. A "once compelling, 
anti-communist rationale for covert action has lost all validity. But this is not to say that 
the United States should eschew the method of covert a c t i o n .  "33 According to Barry 
by applying just war theory to covert actions a reasonable calculus could be set up. It 
would fit all the following criteria: approval by president and appropriate members of 
Congress, intentions clearly spelled out, reasonable, and just, other means would not 
be effective, a reasonable probability of success, and the methods envisioned are 
commensurate with the o b j e c t i v e s .  34 Obviously these standards would greatly reduce 
the number of covert actions attempted, and also tend to make large scale covert actions 
quite difficult to justify. Still Barry is not alone in his insistence that "covert 
interventions abroad should be less f r e q u e n t .  "35
In another study of the ethics of covert actions Arthur S. Hulnick and Daniel W. 
Mattausch attempt to apply ethical theories to covert actions. Examining just war theory 
and shared expectations theory they come to the conclusion that "assassination and aid 
to criminals or terrorists" fall well outside the ethics of a democratic nation, and that 
even for a great power, "the fact that other countries do such things to us does not 
justify similar activity on our part."36 They suggest that it may be possible for a 
democratic nation to engage in such acts, but there must be a public policy consensus. 
Without public consensus such generally immoral acts cannot be attempted.
Loch Johnson, a Church Committee staffer and now Regents Professor at the 
University of Georgia, wants covert actions to be reined in, suggesting the best way of 
doing so is by Congressional oversight. For Johnson, "like original sin, covert action 
is unlikely to d i s a p p e a r .  "37 He does, however, suggest some guidelines for future 
operations in the post-Cold War environment. There are four basic thresholds for
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covert actions in order of seriousness: routine intelligence operations, modest
intrusions, major intrusions, and extreme options. Major intrusions include election
interference and the supplying to arms to rebels. Extreme options range from providing
sophisticated weapons to rebels—Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen—to arranging coup
d'dtats. Johnson would essentially ban extreme options:
In almost all cases, reject secret wars, coup d'6tat and other extreme measures, for if America's 
interests are so jeopardized as to require major forceful intervention, properly authorized overt 
warfare—ideally, multinational in nature and at the invitation of a legitimate government or 
faction- is a mere appropriate and honorable o p t io n .3 8
Major intrusions would be allowed, but only for compelling reasons. Johnson hopes
that under the watchful eye of Congressional oversight, the CIA could return to its
primary task of collecting intelligence and stay out of the covert action arena. Under
Johnson's proposals Nicaragua likely never would have been attempted, while
Afghanistan would have been run overtly, probably by the Pentagon.
Gregory Treverton, like Johnson a member of the Church committee staff, also
has reservations about covert actions. According to Treverton "there needs to be a
higher threshold for the use of covert action, ... the circumstances in which major
covert action makes sense as policy are sharply l i m i t e d . "39 Like Johnson, Treverton
has a series of standards to meet before an action should be considered by policy
makers. Every policy maker should be able to answer three "what if?" questions before
undertaking a covert action. What if it becomes public? What if it does not succeed?
What signal will be received, by whom and with what result?^® The effect of these
questions is to sharply limit large scale actions as well as to favor smaller covert actions
such as propaganda which can answer all three questions positively.
Many critics of the CIA, who still see a need for retaining the CIA in its present
form, agree that covert actions should be judiciously scaled back. For this group covert
actions should only be attempted as a last resort.41 Charles G. Cogan of Harvard
sums up the thinking on covert actions:
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Finally, there is the fundamental question of whether we need covert action now that the Cold 
War is over. Already, in the real world, the budgets for covert action are but a small fraction 
of what they were in the 1980s at the height of regional conflicts. The era of the "900-pound 
gorilla" that was covert action is largely a thing of the past. I think there is a sort of wise 
men's consensus that covert action should be done, but only very sparingly and only in 
response to paramount national interests.42
The sort of large scale paramilitary adventures undertaken in the 1980s no longer apply.
Even agency employees such as John B. Chomeua argue that "if real muscle is needed
and the U.S. government is willing to undertake what in most cases amounts to an act
of war, then the appropriate response becomes the use of either conventional military
force or of forces specializing in low intensity conflict ( L I C ) . " 4 3  At the end of the
Cold War the rationale for major covert actions may have finally expired.
Cracking the Institution
Daniel Patrick Moynihan's proposal for reforming the CIA goes far beyond 
anything the influential senator has done before. At one point in the early 1980s 
Moynihan’s proposals for reforming the CIA were largely borrowed from the Agency 
itself. Moynihan was willing to let many problems in the CIA slide during the Cold 
War since "it was the K G B ,  not the CIA, which threatens d e m o c r a c y . " ^  Still by the 
end of the Cold War, Moynihan would turn from being a mild critic to an actual foe of 
the Agency.
Moynihan's gripe with the CIA essentially came down to the failure to predict 
the fall of the Soviet Union. Rolling Stone reporter, Eric Alterman, describes 
Moynihan’s attack on the agency as "a one man j i h a d . " 4 5  Ever since Moynihan 
became aware of the enormity of the CIA's misreading of the state of the Soviet 
economy, he has had nothing but contempt for the agency. His argument is that if the 
CIA couldn't produce worthwhile intelligence on the country's primary enemy, how 
can it be expected to do anything right While Moynihan's proposal might have initially
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been expected "not to pass" when it was proposed in 1991, by 1994 the "End of the 
Cold War Act" would "be revisited, not just with one, but two, and many others" 
voicing s u p p o r t . 4 6  Still even Moynihan is aware that the CIA is unlikely to be 
abolished in his l i f e t i m e . ^
Moynihan's plan seeks to end the CIA as an agency and to move its 
responsibilities to the State Department and the Pentagon. Moynihan's plan contains 
four basic goals:
1. Disband the analysis directorate, whose functions are largely overlapped by the State 
Department and the Pentagon.
2. Split up the National Reconnaissance Office, "which buys satellites whether we need 
them or not,” into imagery and communications intercept divisions.
3. Reorganize and rename the operations division and "put it someplace else." [Under the 
Pentagon]
4. Keep the director of central intelligence to oversee budget issues and intelligence
targets.48
Obviously the CIA would come to an end under the Moynihan proposal. Still his 
proposal may have defined the middle ground on the intelligence debate. Moynihan's 
proposal began to gather steam again with the Ames scandal, Guatemala, and even the 
CIA briefing on Aristide implying that he had been a mental patient As it turned out no 
one had checked their facts and there was no direct evidence of any hospitalization of 
Aristide. The CIA was accused by Senator Tom Harkin of trying to sabotage Aristide, 
a fair criticism according to a senior CIA official.^ These incidents led to the creation 
of the Aspin Commission to recommend what is to be done with the agency in the 
future.
Another radical reform plan that came out recently is the Gates plan. Long a 
CIA insider, and a DCI under Bush, Gates has his own plans for the CIA. Under the 
Gates plan the CIA would turn covert actions over to the military, the CIA would be 
responsible for only Russia, China, regional powers, and conflicts, terrorism, and 
proliferation. The CIA would also turn over all satellite intelligence to a new agency,
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and the CIA would cut the number of s p i e s . 5 0  Gates' plan retains the CIA while 
greatly reducing its role. His plan also closely resembles the plan of Stansfield Turner 
who would break up the agency by making the Directorate of Operations a separate 
A g e n c y . Dave McCurdy, the former Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, 
follows closely the Gates suggestions emphasizing that analysts should be 
institutionally separated from covert action, to the degree p o s s i b l e . 5 2
Robert Gates, a controversial figure while serving in the CIA, was not exactly a 
likely source for a radical reform proposal. While in the CIA Gates was accused of 
selective ignorance of the Iran-Contra affair which happened on his watch. Gates also 
helped to produce the intelligence reports on the Soviet Union that would later so 
infuriate Senator Moynihan. Finally, Gates was often accused of cooking the books to 
provide support for enhanced defense spending under Reagan and Bush. Senator 
Edward Kennedy describes Gates' record as "one of a cold warrior who skewed 
intelligence to fit his or his superiors' view of the world. He ignored the biggest 
scandal of the decade, intimidated those who disagreed with his views, and ignored the 
crumbling of the Soviet Union long after it began. "53 Still many now look to the Gates 
plan as a likely successor for Moynihan's proposals. While it retains the CIA, it 
implements many of the reforms Moynihan proposed, significantly, putting covert 
actions under the military. His plan is now considered the front runner of the radical 
reform p l a n s . 5 4
There are other reform plans similar to Moynihan's and Gates' that are not 
being widely circulated in Washington. Marcus Raskin, a Senior Fellow at the Institute 
for Policy Studies, has another radical reform plan for the CIA. The plan includes 
opening up the secrecy that shrouds the agency and sharing intelligence with the United 
Nations. Its most important feature is its insistence that the CIA's paramilitary 
operations be put under the Department of Defense, which would "subject them to 
scrutiny and civilian c o n t r o l .  " 5 5  All of these plans share a similarity in acknowledging
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that the CIA would be better off separating intelligence from covert action. As many of
them put the operation under the Pentagon, there is a sense that in the business of
paramilitary actions, the Pentagon is a better place for operations.
John Prados, who has written a history of covert actions, agrees essentially
with Moynihan, Gates, and Raskin. Having cited reasons for the failure of covert
paramilitary actions under the CIA from the creation of artificial oppositions to
informational leaks, Prados presents his solution:
One measure that could help clarify the legal status of paramilitary action would be to end the 
CIA role altogether and put the function squarely within the purview of military special- 
warfare forces. This would ensure maintenance of the capability for wartime, when it has been 
demonstrated historically to be most effective, and reduce the propensity to use this technique 
against the Third World in the service as some Cold War strategy.56
There is an inherent danger, according to Prados, in letting presidents conduct secret
wars with little oversight. By putting paramilitary operations under a military
command, there would no longer be a means for a president to abuse the power
inherent in the operations side of the CIA.
The advantages of the Pentagon are twofold. The Pentagon is subject to well
established civilian control unlike the CIA which still breeds distrust among Congress.
Many members of Congress probably feel that oversight of covert operations will be
significantly easier under the military. Indeed, frustrated by the Iran-Contra affair
Congress pointed out that "this country has been fortunate to have a military that is
sensitive to the constraints built into the Constitution."^ The implication was that
hopefully in the future the CIA could learn to be more like the military, more
accountable to elected officials other then the president. The military also has built in
expertise in paramilitary actions, far more so then the CIA ever attained. The special
forces of the military are trained in complex paramilitary manuvers. The Pentagon
regularly sends many military advisors to other nations sometimes providing advisors
to signifigant rebel movements in those countries. In addition the armed forces of
many nations are brought to the United States for specialized training as provided by
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special schools such as the infamous School of the Americas in Columbus, Georgia. 
Running paramilitary operations is a professional responsibility in the military which 
will not disappear when covert actions calm down for a period of years.
Finally, if covert actions are to be run as "overt" covert actions or simply out in 
the open, then the military can certainly be called upon. There is little point in waging a 
secret war that is essentially open knowledge to the Congress, to the American people, 
and to the target nation. Essentially many recent covert actions such as Nicaragua and 
Afghanistan have been simply undeclared wars. The Pentagon has been called on in 
many recent cases such as Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait to intervene in other nations.
In Afghanistan and Nicaragua the Pentagon could merely have played the role of arms 
supplier and adviser. Certainly assigning operations, especially paramilitary 
operations, to the military is not unthinkable.
There are some distinct problems with turning over covert actions to the 
military. Since the military conducts primarily overt missions, they make a big splash 
when they go in. Another danger associated with this relates to using the armed forces 
of the United States in any situation. While a country may be willing to tolerate some 
CIA interference without declaring war on the United States itself, the same cannot be 
said if the U.S. military is behind the action. Putting the military in an operation tips 
the scales closer to outright warfare. Another problem relating to the Pentagon’s size is 
flexibility. The military cannot be flexible as a small Agency such as the CIA which 
has only a few thousand employees deveoted to covert actions. The Pentagon would 
have some difficulty in staying out of a burecratic rut with regard to covert actions, a 
situation that is much less difficult for the smaller CIA buracracy. Still the Pentagon, 
despite difficulties, could certainly shoulder the additional task of covert actions.
Many of the CIA's covert functions have been taken over by overt agencies. 
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has recently taken over many of the 
election functions that the CIA once conducted covertly. A good example of covert
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functions being replaced by overt measures is the Voice of America, which is now run
overtly though initially its funding was secretive. According to William Robinson of
the Center for International Studies:
Political aid programs—formerly conducted by the CIA with limited success and 
sophistication-have now come in from the cold. "It is not necessary to turn to the covert 
approach," commented former CIA Director William Colby in regard to the NED program. 
"Many of the programs which...were conducted as covert operations [can now be] conducted 
quite openly, and consequentially without controversy."^
If political action can be conducted openly, then as Colby says there is no controversy 
involved. For the CIA and the government non-controversial operations are a 
significant advantage over traditional CIA operations which often become steeped in 
controversy when revealed. If many of the political actions of the CIA can be 
conducted openly and paramilitary actions can be conducted by the military, then there 
may be little need for an active covert action arm of the CIA.
Abolishing Covert Actions or the Agency
Moynihan's proposal does not define the extreme edge of opinion on reforming 
the CIA. Some have called for a complete end to covert actions or even a complete end 
to the CIA. And the CIA would not simply be broken up into smaller pieces like the 
Moynihan plan, but secret intelligence would cease to exist. It is not the first time that 
there have been calls for termination, but with the demise of the Soviet threat, the CIA's 
raison d'etre, such attacks carry more weight.
Even media institutions generally supportive of government such as The New 
York Times have come out against covert actions. On February 1,1993 the editorial 
board of The New York Times suggested that it was time to re-examine covert actions 
to determine "whether they have any use at all. "59 it was a time to decide whether 
covert actions "are truly necessary, and to explore in every case whether democracy is
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better promoted o p e n l y . "60 Certainly such an editorial suggests a general mood in 
favor of eliminating covert actions, at least among media elite.
Editors are not the only opponents of retaining covert action capability in the 
future. Morton Halperin, a former member of the NSC under Nixon, argues that 
covert actions should be abolished by the United States. He contends that covert 
actions get around the necessary public debate over policy. Covert actions cannot be 
openly discussed and agreed upon and thus they serve no purpose in a democracy. 
Halperin believes that "the United States ought not to engage in covert wars or in covert 
operations designed to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. "61 Halperin 
suggests that intervention would still be possible in cases that the public would support 
such as Afghanistan. The intervention would merely be a subject of public debate and 
knowledge, surely making little difference in an "overt" covert operation like 
Afghanistan. The details of the operation would not be needed, but a general 
consensus support for a project would be necessary. In Afghanistan the question 
would be whether or not the United States should support the Mujahideen. Then the 
operation could be debated like any other foreign policy issue in Congress, the media, 
and among the public. Thus the CIA would be out of the covert business in regards to 
running operations supposedly hidden or at least plausibly deniable.
Others are more critical of the entire agency, covert actions included. Their 
solution is simply to end the CIA as it stands without dispersing its various functions to 
other government agencies. Representative Ron Dellums declared in 1980 that "we 
should totally dismantle every intelligence agency in this country piece by piece, nail by 
nail, brick by b r i c k . " 6 2  Some leftist critics of the agency argue it is time to do just this. 
The editors of The Progressive declare that "this is not the time to reform the CIA. It is 
the time to shut it d o w n . " 6 3  Kevin Kelley of the Utne Reader as well argues that "the 
Central Intelligence Agency may stand out as the ultimate example of a bureaucracy 
whose life span has been pointlessly p r o l o n g e d . " 6 4  These critics are not alone.
I l l
Many former employees of the agency such as John Stockwell and Philip Agee 
have become famous, or infamous in the CIA's view, for publishing damaging reports 
of just what goes on within the CIA, most importantly what goes on in the operations 
directorate. Morally outraged at the practices they saw and performed they argued that 
the CIA should be abolished. Stockwell, an operational specialist, worked with the 
Agency through the Angola o p e r a t i o n . 6 5  Philip Agee probably the harshest critic of the 
CIA, now residing in Britain, exposed the CIA in his 1975 bestseller, Inside the 
Company: CIA Diary.66 Agee is easily the most controversial of former CIA 
employees having published individual agents names. Both of them agree in general 
that the CIA ought to be abolished. They contend that the CIA has consistently lied to 
Congress, engaged in bloody covert actions and assassinations, and generally hidden a 
host of problems under a veil of secrecy. Stockwell even refers to Gregory Treverton's 
book length criticism of covert actions as a "restrained critique. "67 The two obviously 
see no future for the CIA. For Stockwell and Agee the CIA should be ended as soon as 
possible.
Final Conclusions
For the purposes of this study, the contentious debate over intelligence is less 
important. What is important is covert actions, in particular large covert actions. 
Examining the two largest and most public covert actions of the 1980s should provide 
some lessons for policy makers looking at the fate of future covert actions.
The cases of Afghanistan and Nicaragua help to cast further doubts on the 
ultimate usefulness of covert actions. There have been no flawless successes in the 
history of the CIA's covert actions. By the standards used in this study there have 
certainly been successes. Operations in Iran and Guatemala would certainly be ranked
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as successes, but these same standards would make for a long list of failures beginning 
with Indonesia in 1957 "one of the CIA's first major covert-action failures."^
Admittedly, large scale covert actions are difficult ventures often with 
unpredictable long term consequences. The very nature of a secret intervention in 
another country invites difficulty. Still the CIA cannot claim many successes at large 
scale covert actions, especially of a paramilitary nature. Election interference has been 
more successful though it has its share of failures as well. The overall success rate of 
covert actions is not high.
The outcome of the Nicaragua case is not surprising. Nicaragua was a 
contentious issue throughout the 1980s. It was a case argued before the American 
public which never gained majority support. When the CIA was legally separated from 
the operation, Reagan and Casey were willing to continue aiding the Contras despite the 
illegality of the venture. The Contras never had widespread support among the 
Nicaraguan population. While the Sandinistas may have lost much of their initial 
popularity after bringing down Somoza, they were still widely supported as contrasted 
with the National Guard led Contras. Eventually after a decade of almost open warfare 
the United States succeeded in removing the Sandinistas from power by free elections, 
though they were heavily bought by American money, and threats of renewing aid to 
the Contras. Nicaragua never met the measure of a clear and supportable policy, and 
the rationale behind keeping the operation covert was less then convincing.
Afghanistan is perhaps a different story. Many consider the Afghanistan 
operation at least to be an "arguable success. "69 Many cold warriors consider 
Afghanistan much more than arguable; they consider Afghanistan an example of 
Reagan standing up to the Soviets and helping to bring down the entire communist 
system. Still by the standards set forth in chapter II Afghanistan is a mild failure. 
These same standards are weighted in favor of U.S. interests, from a more neutral
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position Afghanistan would appear to be a greater failure. As a mild failure, 
Afghanistan is a convincing argument that large scale covert actions have failed.
At this point some general conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. Both 
the case studies involved proxy armies fighting against perceived communists, the 
Sandinistas in one case and the Soviets in the other. Both case studies took place at the 
end of the Cold War. And finally, both case were failures. Looking at the reform 
plans now on the table, one can make several suggestions. Three basic courses of 
action are warranted in regards to covert action.
First, it seems likely that at the very least the CIA needs to seriously consider 
lessening emphasis on covert actions. There may very well be success stories in covert 
actions, but the two largest covert actions of the last decade were not. Many of the 
plans stressing moderate reforms include emphasis on cutting back on covert actions. 
Covert actions as pursued under Carter seem a relatively successful model. Under 
Carter there were no major controversial operations. While it is true that both the 
Nicaragua and Afghan operations started under the Carter administration, they were 
small operations with limited objectives. Under Reagan both of the operations would 
expand at a dramatic pace and ultimately fail. Carter's only major covert action failure 
was an attempt to rescue hostages in Iran. If the past few years are any indication then 
covert actions are once again in decline, the only publicly rumored actions were in Haiti 
and Bosnia.
Future covert actions should be conducted only in extreme cases where keeping 
the intervention covert is absolutely necessary to success. Even if this is the case there 
needs to be clear policy goals set forth, and public support for the objectives. Public 
support for the objectives may mean simply full Congressional knowledge by the 
relevant committees, or if basic policy goals can be debated without jeopardizing the 
action then the case should be brought before the public at large for debate. Nicaragua 
would have never been approved under these standards, and the country may have been
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better off. Afghanistan would never have met the need for covertness though it could 
have easily been ran overtly with debate over the general running of the aid program to 
the Mujahideen.
Second, the Pentagon could easily take over paramilitary covert actions, the 
most controversial of all interventions. Moving operations out of the CIA would allow 
the CIA to concentrate fully on intelligence without the constant controversy brought on 
by operations. The Pentagon has a history of civilian oversight and cooperation with 
Congress that the CIA has lacked. As mentioned before the Pentagon is fully capable 
of running professional paramilitary campaigns. Covert operations that have been ran 
semi-overtly could now be ran with the full acknowledgment of the U.S. role. Some 
other operations initially ran by the CIA covertly have now been moved out of the CIA 
and conducted in the open. The NED is a prime example of removing CIA functions 
such as election interference and transferring them to a public agency which freely 
acknowledges the U.S. hand in its operations. Most large scale covert actions by the 
CIA have lost their true covert status. The world obviously knew even many details of 
both the Afghan and Nicaraguan operations.
By running paramilitary covert actions overtly out of the Pentagon or even 
covertly the CIA would stand to gain back significant respect. Had Nicaragua been 
conducted by the Pentagon instead of the CIA, it likely would have been more 
successful. There have been similar missions conducted by the military in Latin 
America most notably in Panama and Grenada. Still the likelihood in the case of 
Nicaragua is that it never would have been attempted. The Contras did not present a 
significant military force capable of overthrowing the Sandinista regime. That would 
have meant an invasion by Pentagon forces would have been necessary, an extremely 
unlikely possibility considering the public mood towards such a military adventure. In 
the case of Afghanistan the military would have been useful. It is unlikely that the 
Pentagon would have let the Pakistanis have such incredible influence on the
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Mujahideen. The Pentagon would have insisted on U.S. planning of operations and 
training of the Mujahideen if the project was U.S. financed. An operation run by the 
Pentagon instead of the CIA could have been far more successful considering the 
amount of corruption in the Pakistani military and the incredible portion of the aid that 
was stolen by the Pakistanis. In summary there is a powerful argument that if the 
country is to keep its covert action potential intact, secret operations should be farmed 
out to the Pentagon.
Finally, there is the possibility of banning covert actions altogether. This would 
mean an end to large scale actions which involve secret intervention in the affairs of 
other nations. This course has the advantage of meeting high ethical standards, much 
as the banning of assassinations by President Ford brought some respect back to the 
Agency. It would end the CIA's most controversial mission and bring renewed focus 
to intelligence. While it remains an unlikely prospect, it could well be followed in 
practice if not in principle in the future. If presidents take it upon themselves to use 
covert actions sparingly or not at all then the effect would be almost the same as a 
complete ban on covert actions.
As the 17 members of the Aspin Commission prepare their report on the 
intelligence community and suggest reforms in the CIA they should strongly consider 
the more radical reform plans.70 As the two case studies indicate the latest large scale 
covert actions have not been very successful ventures. The most damning case is 
Afghanistan which is often considered a CIA success. If an operation like Afghanistan 
can be a mild failure then there is a genuine need to consider just how useful covert 
actions are, especially at the end of the Cold War. Aspin has promised to "start with a 
blank piece of paper" and stick to the best solution to the problem even if that means 
"abolishing the agency."71 Still the commission appears to be another attempt to save 
the CIA—recommending mild reforms but leaving the basic institution intact. That 
would be a tragic mistake.
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